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ABSTRACT
In psychology, the abstract/concrete distinction refers to a distinction among
concepts, which is typically characterized as follows. Concrete concepts are
those whose referents can be experienced through sensation/perception, such
as dog or pond, whereas abstract concepts are those whose referents lack this
attribute, such as truth (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005; Connell & Lynott, 2012;
Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014). This thesis describes and, using word
association, tests several theories of conceptual representation motivated by the
abstract/concrete distinction (or, where not motivated by it, with potential
implications related to it). These include Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986,
2007), Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008), Language and
Situated Simulations (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008), and Different
Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010). We find
mixed support for Dual Coding Theory and Perceptual Symbol Systems, strong
support for Language and Situated Simulations, and no support for Different
Representational Frameworks.
Keywords: abstract and concrete concepts, dual coding, language,
representation, simulation, word association
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE ABSTRACT/CONCRETE DISTINCTION AND ITS VALUE
When philosophers discuss the abstract/concrete distinction, they refer typically
to a distinction among objects or entities (Rosen, 2001). Where objects like dogs
and ponds and trees are considered concrete, those like the letter 'A' and
Shakespeare's 'Hamlet' are considered abstract. However, there is little
consensus on what characterizes this distinction. While a common theme is that
abstract objects lack key attributes possessed by concrete objects, just what
these attributes are varies by account (e.g., mentality and sensibility, or spatiality
and causal efficacy; Rosen, 2001). By contrast, psychology draws its
abstract/concrete distinction not among objects, but concepts. Moreover, there is
general agreement on how the distinction should be characterized. Concrete
concepts are those whose referents can be experienced through
sensation/perception1, such as dog or pond or tree, whereas abstract concepts
are those whose referents lack this attribute, such as love or truth (Paivio, Yuille,
& Madigan, 1968; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005; Connell & Lynott, 2012;
Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014). Presumably, that this characterization
has not proven contentious is because of the following set of circumstances: (1)
the characterization is the basis for instructions used to obtain concept
concreteness ratings (i.e., participants' assessments of how concrete or abstract
a concept is; e.g., Brysbaert et al., 2014), (2) concept concreteness ratings are
used as independent variables in studies that yield significant empirical findings,
(3) these findings—besides being valuable to psychology in and of themselves—
are relied upon by a number of influential psychological theories (Figure 1).

1

The word "perception" is here and elsewhere in this thesis taken to mean "nonverbal perception".
This shortcut has become commonplace in the literature. However, it can be confusing in the context
of a perceptual versus verbal system, as all verbal objects (e.g., words, phrases) inhere in perception.
A similar point is made by Paivio, 2007 (p. 35, footnote 5).
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Figure 1. Psychology's characterization of the abstract/concrete distinction is the basis for instructions
that are used to obtain concept concreteness ratings. Concept concreteness ratings serve as
independent variables in studies yielding significant empirical findings. These findings—besides being
valuable to psychology in and of themselves—are import for a number of influential psychological
theories.

This thesis focuses on outlining and testing several theories of conceptual
representation motivated by the abstract/concrete concept distinction. Some of
these take the distinction literally, for example, by offering a view in which
concrete, but not abstract, concepts are represented by sensory/perceptual
experience (Paivio, 1986, 2007). Others take it less literally, for example, by
suggesting that both abstract and concrete concepts are represented through
sensory/perceptual experience albeit in differing manners that recapitulate the
distinction (Barsalou, 1999, 2008).

1.2 THEORIES ADDRESSING THE DISTINCTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW
The theories covered are Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007), Perceptual
Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008), Language and Situated Simulations
(Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008), and Different Representational
Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010). Tenets and relevant
studies for each are discussed in turn.

1.2.1 DUAL CODING THEORY (DCT)
Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007) is characterized here as a theory of
conceptual representation based on a series of nested ideas. The first and most
general idea is that the mind contains symbolic systems, which are derived from,
but functionally orthogonal to, sensorimotor systems (Table 1). Symbolic systems
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Table 1. Orthogonal conceptual relations between symbolic systems and sensorimotor systems with
examples of types of modality-specific information represented in each subsystem. Table and title
recreated from Paivio (1986, p. 57, 2007, p. 36).
Sensorimotor systems

Symbolic systems
Verbal

Visual
Auditory
Haptic
Gustation
Olfaction
Emotion

Visual words
Auditory words
Braille, handwriting
—
—
—

Nonverbal
Visual objects
Environmental sounds
"Feel" of objects
Taste memories
Smell memories
Felt emotions

have the general attributes of systems—that is, they consist of parts forming a
unitary whole—but deal specifically in mental representations. The second idea
is that, among the various symbolic systems in the mind, two are fundamental in
the sense that they are not also symbolic subsystems (Table 1). These are the
nonverbal and verbal systems. According to Paivio (1986, 2007), the nonverbal
and verbal systems exhibit key differences. The most central among these is that
the nonverbal system processes "imagens" (fundamental units of nonverbal
information, which include, for example, geometric forms, objects, or scenes),
whereas the verbal system processes "logogens" (fundamental units of verbal
information, which include, for example, words, stock phrases, or memorized
poems). Another difference relates to their evolution and development. The
nonverbal system is evolutionarily older than, and developmentally prior to, the
verbal system, which might in fact depend on the nonverbal system for its
evolution (2007, p. 279) and development (1986, p. 87-90). In the quote below,
Paivio makes explicit the functionally independent nature of the two systems.
Note, however, that while the two systems are separable, they maintain
referential connections, and in fact it is because of these connections, rather than
despite them, that they avoid being made into one larger system.
A final question is whether it is also necessary to postulate an Aristotelian
common sense that is completely amodal and capable of representing all
sense modalities and accommodating the relation between nonverbal and
verbal representations—a kind of interlingua that mediates transfer from
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one system to the other. Such a common representational system is
precisely what propositional theorists propose, but dual coding theory
incorporates a different view. The experiential derivation of the
sensorimotor subsystems implies that they must be interconnected
because of co-occurrences in experience and yet capable of functioning
independently. The functional interconnections permit activation of one
subsystem by another. The mediating interlingua is unnecessary and
logically undesirable because it is unparsimonious and leads to an infinite
regress of mediating interlingua (Paivio, 1986, p. 58).
The third idea—the first to address the abstract/concrete distinction—is that
concrete concepts are represented in both the nonverbal and verbal system,
whereas abstract concepts are represented only in the verbal system. It is at the
level of this third idea that DCT gives rise to specific hypotheses.
One of these hypotheses is that, because concrete concepts are represented in
two systems and abstract concepts in one, the former are processed more
efficiently than the latter. Evidence of this "concreteness effect" is replete in the
literature. Experiments using lexical decision (James, 1975; Bleasdale, 1987),
recall (Paivio, Yuille, & Smythe, 1966; Romani, McAlpine, & Martin, 2007) and
word naming (de Groot, 1989; Schwanenflugel & Stowe, 1989) have all
demonstrated faster and/or more accurate processing for concrete than abstract
concepts. However, despite the apparent ubiquity of the concreteness effect,
there are reasons for doubt. First, experiments do not always reveal the
concreteness effect (e.g., Experiments 3 and 4 in James, 1975; control
conditions in Papagno, Fogliata, Catricalà, & Miniussi, 2009). Second, the
concreteness effect might not be a concreteness effect per se. For example,
Gernsbacher (1984) found that James' (1975) lexical decision advantage for
concrete concepts could be accounted for using familiarity ratings (i.e.,
participants' assessments of how often they see, hear, or use a concept) in place
of concreteness ratings. Comparably, Connell and Lynott (2012) found that
ratings of perceptual strength (i.e., participants' assessments of the extent to
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which a concept is experienced through a given sense) are better predictors of
lexical decision and word naming than are concreteness ratings. Third, a number
of studies have demonstrated a reverse concreteness effect. For example,
Pexman, Hargreaves, Edwards, Henry, and Goodyear (2007) found that
participants were quicker to categorize abstract than concrete concepts as nonedible, and Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, and Del Campo (2011) found
that holding imageability and context availability constant led to faster lexical
decisions for abstract than concrete concepts (which they ultimately attributed to
greater emotional valence of abstract concepts).
A second hypothesis is that—because they inhere in different systems—the
spatial distribution of neural activity differs during processing of abstract and
concrete concepts (Holcomb, Kounios, Anderson, & West, 1999). Like the
concreteness effect, this notion of "spatial distinctiveness" (Holcomb et al., 1999)
receives strong support from the literature. For example, Kounios and Holcomb
(1994) recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants made lexical
decisions on abstract and concrete concepts. Compared to abstract concepts,
concrete concepts elicited more negative-going ERPs over the right hemisphere
at 300-500 ms and 500-800 ms. Switching the task from lexical decision to
concrete-abstract classification (i.e., 'is the concept concrete or abstract?') led to
the same, but larger, effects. It also revealed greater repetition effects over the
left hemisphere at 300-500 ms and 500-800 ms for abstract concepts, and over
the right hemisphere at 500-800 ms for concrete concepts2. In a related study,
Holcomb et al. (1999) recorded ERPs while participants read sentences whose
terminal words varied in concreteness and congruency3. Compared to
2

Note that, besides demonstrating spatial distinctiveness, these findings confirm another postulate of
DCT, which is that the nonverbal system is associated largely with the right and/or both hemispheres,
and the verbal system with the left hemisphere (Paivio, 1986, p. 264; 2007, p. 133).
3

Some examples from Holcomb et al. (1999):
Concrete congruent – Armed robbery implies that the thief used a weapon.
Concrete anomalous – Armed robbery implies that the thief used a rose.
Concrete neutral – They said it was because of the rose.
Abstract congruent – Lisa argued that this had not been the case in one single instance.
Abstract anomalous – Lisa argued that this had not been the case in one single fun.
Abstract neutral – They said it was because of the fun.
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anomalous abstract words, anomalous concrete words elicited more negativegoing ERPs over numerous, but especially anterolateral, sites at 300-500 ms and
500-800 ms. This was also the case for abstract versus concrete neutral words.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) offer still more evidence of spatial distinctiveness
effects. Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, and Medler (2005) used fMRI to
scan individuals' brains as they made lexical decisions on abstract and concrete
concepts. Abstract concepts elicited greater activation in the left precentral gyrus,
left inferior frontal gyrus and sulcus, and left superior temporal gyrus, whereas
concrete concepts elicited greater activation in bilateral angular gyri, the right
middle temporal gyrus, the left middle frontal gyrus, bilateral posterior cingulate
gyri, and bilateral precunei. Papagno et al. (2009) applied rTMS to participants'
scalps while they made lexical decisions on abstract and concrete concepts.
Abstract concept decision accuracy was impaired by stimulating the left inferior
frontal gyrus and left posterior-superior temporal gyrus, whereas concrete
concept decision accuracy was impaired by stimulating the right posteriorsuperior temporal gyrus.
In summary, DCT (Paivio, 1986, 2007) is based on three nested ideas. The first
idea is that the mind contains symbolic systems, which are derived from, but
functionally orthogonal to, sensorimotor systems. The second idea is that, among
the various symbolic systems in the mind, the verbal and nonverbal systems are
fundamental. The third idea is that concrete concepts are represented in both the
nonverbal and verbal system, whereas abstract concepts are represented only in
the verbal system. It is at the level of this third idea that DCT gives rise to
testable hypotheses, which include (1) concrete concepts being processed more
efficiently than abstract concepts, and (2) differences in the spatial distribution of
neural activity during processing of abstract and concrete concepts. Both
hypotheses are supported by empirical evidence.
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1.2.2 PERCEPTUAL SYMBOL SYSTEMS (PSS)
Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) proposes that during
experience, the brain's modal systems—that is, systems responsible for senseperception, action, and introspection—produce specific patterns of neural activity.
Selective attention operates on these patterns to isolate important subsets from
them. These subsets are extracted and stored in long-term memory as
"perceptual symbols" (e.g., specific memories of black, sweet, or paw). Over
time, related perceptual symbols congregate to form "frames". For example,
specific memories of black may form a black frame, and specific memories of
muzzle, paw, and tail may form a dog frame. The function of frames is to
construct "simulations", which are top down activations of the brain's modal
systems that reenact experiences toward some end. For example, when a dog is
encountered and arm muscles need to be engaged to pet the dog, relevant
frames (e.g., a dog frame) construct simulations consisting of sensorimotor
system activation that reenacts the experience of petting. Taken together, frames
and their simulations constitute "simulators", which are equivalent to concepts,
and, in multitude, form a "situated simulation system". This simulation system is
at the center of conceptual processing in both nonhumans and humans, and in
the latter, is accompanied by a linguistic system which evolved from it as a
means of controlling it.
Based on this description, it is clear that PSS shares features with DCT (see also
Paivio, 2007, p. 118). For example, both posit sensorimotor/multimodal origins to
conceptual processing, both incorporate separate systems for processing
nonverbal/simulative and verbal/linguistic information, and both suggest that their
nonverbal/simulation system serves as the evolutionary and developmental
substrate for their verbal/linguistic system (Barsalou, 1999, p. 607; Paivio, 1986,
p. 87-90, 2007, p. 279). But, considered more deeply, PSS and DCT are rather
different. In DCT, information captured from the brain's modal systems is
maintained as is in conceptual representations ("...DCT representations are
isomorphic, holistic copies of modality-specific objects and events"; Paivio, 2007,
p. 119). By contrast, in PSS, such information is readily parsed by selective
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attention and then integrated with other similar information before contributing to
conceptual representations. Further, where both DCT's nonverbal and verbal
systems partake in deep conceptual processing, PSS prioritizes in this regard its
simulation system over what it sees as a more peripheral linguistic system
(Barsalou, 2008, p. 622; see also upcoming discussion on Language and
Situated Simulations).
Consequently, PSS makes different claims than does DCT about how abstract
and concrete concepts are represented. Compared to DCT's asymmetrical
representation across systems, PSS suggests that both types of concepts might
be represented in a nonverbal/simulation system (Barsalou, 1999, 2008;
Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). In that case, what distinguishes abstract
from concrete concepts are different types of simulations (Barsalou & WiemerHastings, 2005). Simulations related to abstract concepts might focus on
introspective and setting/event properties of situations. For example, simulations
related to 'true' might focus on "a speaker’s claim, a listener’s representation of
the claim, and the listener’s assessment of the claim" (Barsalou & WiemerHastings, 2005, p .136). Simulations related to concrete concepts, on the other
hand, might focus on critical objects and their properties4. For example,
simulations related to 'dog' might focus on paw and furry. Consistent with these
differences is the idea that abstract concept representations are more complex
than concrete concept representations (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005).
Currently, the weight of evidence for PSS comes not from its predictions about
the abstract/concrete distinction, but more general aspects of cognition and
perception (see Barsalou, 2008, p. 623-631). However, evidence of the former
type is accumulating. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) recorded
participants as they verbally provided characteristics of three abstract concepts,
three concrete concepts, and three concepts intermediate in concreteness for
one minute. Recordings were transcribed and individual statements were
4

This claim is comparable to DCT's claim that some concrete concepts can be represented, at least
partly, as images (Paivio, 2007, p. 120; Katz & Paivio, 1975).
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assigned to one of five classes (and 45 subclasses): taxonomic, entity,
introspective, setting/event, or miscellaneous. Assignment to the taxonomic class
meant that the statement included a taxonomic relation to the concept, such as a
subordinate (e.g., "seagulls" for the concept 'bird'). Assignment to the entity class
meant that the statement described a property of a physical object, such as an
external component (e.g., "beaks") or entity behavior (e.g., "chirping").
Assignment to the setting/event class meant that the statement described a
property of a setting or event, such as a location (e.g., "(like) downtown areas").
Assignment to the introspective class meant that the statement described the
mental state of an individual in a situation, such as an evaluation (e.g., "(can be
like) annoying"). Assignment to the miscellaneous class meant that the statement
was either a hesitation (e.g., "um") or a meta-comment (e.g., "and I think of") or
that it repeated the concept or a previous statement. Analyses revealed that all
three concept types focused on setting/event properties. However, in line with
PSS, abstract concepts focused on setting/event and introspective properties
more than did concrete concepts and concepts intermediate in concreteness.
Furthermore, concrete concepts focused on entity properties more than did
abstract concepts and concepts intermediate in concreteness. Finally, concepts
intermediate in concreteness fell in between abstract and concrete concepts in
their classes of focus. Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) found comparable results
in a similar study that used 18 abstract and 18 concrete concepts.
Another study providing evidence for PSS's claims about the abstract/concrete
distinction—and one of particular relevance to this thesis because of its reliance
on word association—was performed by Marques and Nunes (2012). In
Experiment 1, word association pairs were selected from the University of South
Florida free association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998; more on this
in Section 2.2.1). Word association pairs are stimulus-response pairs (e.g., dogpaw) generated by presenting individuals with a stimulus word (e.g., dog) and
instructing them to provide a response word (e.g., paw) (more on this in Sections
2.1 and 2.2.1). The particular word association pairs that were selected were the
two most commonly produced pairs for each of 47 abstract and 47 concrete
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concepts (which served as stimulus words and were all nouns). Three
independent coders assigned each word association pair to one of the following
three classes based on the relationship of its stimulus and response words:
linguistic, taxonomic, or object-situation. Assignment to the linguistic class meant
that the response word was linguistically related to the stimulus word. For
example, bee ® hive, where the stimulus word and response word form a
forward compound continuation. Assignment to the taxonomic class meant that
the response word was taxonomically but not linguistically related to the stimulus
word. For example, dog ® animal, where the response word is a superordinate
of the stimulus word. Assignment to the object-situation class meant that the
response word was either a property or thematic/situational associate of the
stimulus word that was not linguistically or taxonomically related to it. For
example, bee ® wings, where the response word is a property of the stimulus
word. Furthermore, linguistic word association pairs were considered to come
from a language-based system (akin to DCT's verbal system and PSS's linguistic
system), and object-situation word association pairs were considered to come
from a sensorimotor-based system (akin to DCT's verbal system and PSS's
simulation system). Analyses of the codings revealed that object-situation word
association pairs were produced with equal frequency for abstract and concrete
concepts. Therefore, the authors concluded that abstract concepts are indeed
represented in a sensorimotor-based (i.e., nonverbal/simulation) system—
consistent with PSS, but not DCT. However, further analyses revealed that (1)
linguistic word association pairs were produced more frequently for abstract than
concrete concepts, and (2) linguistic word association pairs were produced more
frequently than object-situation word association pairs for abstract concepts. Both
of these findings clearly accord with DCT's claim about asymmetrical
representation. All findings were replicated in Experiment 2, which used the
same concepts (i.e., stimulus words) alongside newly collected response words.
While findings of the sort above are consistent with what PSS claims about
abstract and concrete concept simulation, they provide no guarantee that
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simulation is in fact taking place. In theory, linguistic processing might be
responsible for all or part of the observed results. This possibility is especially
problematic for what PSS claims about abstract concepts, as there is little doubt
that concrete concepts undergo nonlinguistic processing (the picture-word
priming literature attests to this, e.g., Vanderwart, 1984). Accordingly, some
recent studies have been aimed at examining the relationship between abstract
concepts and nonlinguistic processing. For example, Wilson-Mendenhall,
Simmons, Martin, and Barsalou (2013) had participants perform a concept-scene
matching task involving abstract and concrete concepts while fMRI searched for
activity in brain regions presumed responsible for nonlinguistic processing of
those concepts. Such activity was indeed discovered for not only concrete but
also abstract concepts. Another example comes from McRae, Nedjadrasul, Pau,
Lo, and King (2017), who relied on picture-word and word-picture priming. In
Experiment 1, participants made lexical decisions on abstract words that were
preceded by either related or unrelated pictures of situations (e.g., 'share'
preceded by a picture of two girls sharing a corn cob. Decision latencies for
abstract words were shorter following related than unrelated pictures5. In the
second experiment, participants made normalcy decisions (i.e., 'yes, normal'
versus 'no, abnormal') to pictures depicting situations that were preceded by
either related or unrelated words (e.g., two girls sharing a corn cob preceded by
'share'). Decision latencies for pictures depicting situations were shorter following
related than unrelated abstract words. Presumably, because the individual
elements appearing in the situation pictures (e.g., a corn cob) had no obvious
semantic relations with the abstract words (e.g., 'share'), the results were not due
to a mediation process (i.e., Paivio, 2007, p. 101-102) where, for example,
abstract words (e.g., 'danger') activate concrete words (e.g., 'highway') that
activate concrete nonverbal information (e.g., an image of a road sign) that leads
to a response. Instead, it appears that abstract concepts are grounded directly in
nonverbal information—consistent with PSS-style simulation.

5

Note, this was the case when pictures were presented for 1000 but not 500 ms. The authors suggest
that because pictures of situations are complex, time is required to process them.

12
In summary, PSS (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005)
suggests that a simulation system is at the center of conceptual processing.
Consequently, PSS makes different claims than does DCT about how abstract
and concrete concepts are represented. Compared to DCT's asymmetrical
representation across systems, PSS suggests that both types of concepts might
be represented in a nonverbal/simulation system. In that case, what distinguishes
abstract from concrete concepts are different types of simulations. Simulations
related to abstract concepts might focus on introspective and setting/event
properties of situations. In contrast, simulations related to concrete concepts
might focus on critical objects and their properties. Empirical evidence supports
(1) the existence of the simulation system, (2) the idea that the simulation system
accounts for both abstract and concrete concepts, and (3) the idea that
simulations related to abstract concepts focus on introspective and setting/event
properties, whereas those related to concrete concepts focus on critical objects
and their properties.

1.2.3 LANGUAGE AND SITUATED SIMULATIONS (LASS)
Language and Situated Simulations (Barsalou et al., 2008), rather than being a
completely novel theory, extends PSS by explicating the role of the linguistic
system. Note, however, that unlike PSS (and DCT and theories discussed later
on), LASS is not directly motivated by the abstract/concrete distinction. We
include it because of its connection to PSS and because it may have
undiscovered implications related to the distinction (which we test). Borghi et al.
(2017) make a similar observation:
LASS theory is not specifically aimed at explaining abstract concepts. In
principle, one could conclude from its principles that, while concrete
concepts activate the simulation system, abstract concepts activate the
linguistic one. However, this conclusion is not proposed by the LASS,
even if [it] is consistent with its principles (Borghi et al., 2017, p. 275).
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According to LASS, as a word is perceived (e.g., walnut), the linguistic system is
activated in order to categorize the word's linguistic form (e.g., the auditory or
visual instantiation of 'walnut'). As the linguistic form is categorized, it sets off a
cascade of related and largely concurrent events. Depending on the task at
hand, these may include simulation system activation intended to represent the
linguistic form's deeper meaning (e.g., 'walnut' ® someone cracking a walnut) as
well as production of associated linguistic forms (e.g., 'walnut' ® 'acorn'), which
may also engage the simulation system (e.g., 'acorn' ® a squirrel eating an
acorn). There are two empirically important suggestions here. The first is that
linguistic system activity peaks before simulation system activity when cues are
words (Figure 2). This idea receives support from a study by Santos, Chaigneau,
Simmons, and Barsalou (2011), which is discussed below. The second
suggestion is that linguistic processing works on linguistic forms—e.g., spoken or
written words—devoid of their perceptual referents, which are instead processed
in the simulation system. In other words, linguistic processing is relatively
superficial. Barsalou et al. (2008) point to work on lexical processing as evidence
for this suggestion (p. 249-250). Note also that the description above concerns
single word perception. When cues are phrases or sentences, the complexity of
linguistic processing, simulations, and their interplay increases dramatically
(Barsalou et al., 2008).

Figure 2. Linguistic system (L) activity precedes situated simulation system (SS) activity when
conceptual processing is cued by words. Figure recreated from Barsalou et al. (2008, p. 248).
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Evidence for LASS comes mainly from Santos et al. (2011), and relates to its
time course predictions. In Experiment 1, participants were shown stimulus
words and asked to provide response words based on what came to mind (i.e.,
they performed word association—specifically, continuous association; more on
this in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.1). For example, shown the word 'dog', they may
have responded 'animal' then 'cat' then 'terrier'. Response words were recorded
and then assigned to one of three classes (and ten subclasses) based on their
relationship with their stimulus word: linguistic, taxonomic, or object-situation6.
Assignment to the linguistic class meant that the response word was linguistically
related to the stimulus word. For example, bee ® hive, where the stimulus word
and response word form a forward compound continuation. Assignment to the
taxonomic class meant that the response word was taxonomically, but not
linguistically, related to the stimulus word. For example, dog ® animal, where the
response word is a superordinate of the stimulus word. Assignment to the objectsituation class meant that the response word was either a property or situational
associate of the stimulus word that was not linguistically or taxonomically related
to it. For example, bee ® wings, where the response word is a property of the
stimulus word. Santos et al. analyzed response word positions (i.e., whether they
were the first, second, third, etc. response word given) and response word
classes. Linguistic response words (average response position of 1.61) preceded
taxonomic response words (average response position of 2.03), which preceded
object-situation response words (average response position of 2.47), verifying
LASS's claim that linguistic system activity peaks prior to simulation system
activity when cues are words. Worth noting is that taxonomic response words
occupy a middle position between linguistic and object-situation response words.
This implies that the linguistic and simulation system are co-responsible for them.
In Experiment 2, participants performed a property generation task, which yielded
results similar to Santos et al.'s Experiment 1.

6

This procedure was essentially the same as the earlier described procedure used by Marques and
Nunes (2012). We choose to redescribe it here.
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In summary, LASS (Barsalou et al., 2008) extends PSS by explicating the role of
the linguistic system. In doing so, it makes two important suggestions. The first is
that linguistic system activity peaks before simulation system activity when cues
are words. The second is that the linguistic system works on linguistic forms
devoid of their perceptual referents, which are instead processed in the
simulation system. Both of these suggestions receive empirical support.

1.2.4 DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIONAL FRAMEWORKS (DRF)
Different Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010)
departs from the theories discussed so far in several ways. First, it is best
characterized as a theory about abstract/concrete concept representation, rather
than one that relies on abstract/concrete concept representation to substantiate
more general claims about, for example, between-system (DCT) or within-system
(PSS) mechanics of conceptual processing. Second, it proposes that different
organizations—rather than distributions across systems (DCT) or simulations
(PSS)—are what is responsible for differences in abstract and concrete concept
representations. Specifically, whereas abstract concept representations are
organized by semantic association, concrete ones are organized by semantic
similarity. Third, it makes no assumptions about whether a single or multiple
systems are involved in representing concepts; "in stipulating the importance of
different types of representation, we have made no suggestion that these
necessarily constitute separate systems" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 68).
Fourth, it does not explicitly incorporate nonverbal/simulation-type and/or
verbal/linguistic-type systems at all, although it does not rule them out (Crutch &
Warrington, 2010):
...this hypothesis is not entirely incompatible with previous theories,
particularly if, for example, the dual-coding theory’s “verbal system” was
reframed as an associative representational structure, and the sensory
system was reframed as representations of similarity-based information
(Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 47).
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DRF's main claim is that "abstract words have a relatively greater dependence
than concrete words upon representations of semantic association and that
concrete words have a relatively greater dependence than abstract words upon
representations of similarity-based information" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p.
47). Figure 3 depicts two possible relationships between concreteness and
similarity/association consistent with this claim (Crutch & Warrington, 2010). In
both cases, concreteness is positively correlated with semantic similarity, and
negatively correlated with semantic association.

Figure 3. Two possible relationships between concreteness and semantic similarity/association
consistent with DRF. Figure recreated from Crutch & Warrington (2010, p. 48).

Evidence for DRF comes largely from a series of neuropsychological studies by
Crutch and Warrington. The first of these studies (Crutch & Warrington, 2005)
utilized a semantic refractory access dysphasia patient on the premise that they
would exhibit semantic interference effects due to a "sensitivity to the semantic
relatedness of test stimuli" (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, p. 616). In Experiment 4
of the study, the patient was presented with arrays of (1A) semantically similar
abstract words (e.g., array 1: boil, heat, cook, fry; array 2: look, peek, glance,
see), (1B) controls produced by reorganizing words from across 1A arrays (e.g.,
array 1: boil, look, gale, clean; array 2: heat, peek, wind, eat), (2A) semantically
similar concrete words (e.g., array 1: goose, crow, sparrow, pigeon; array 2:
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cardigan, jacket, blouse, pullover), and (2B) controls produced by reorganizing
words from across 2A arrays (e.g., array 1: goose, melon, pullover, biscuit; array
2: banana, cardigan, pizza, sparrow). As words from a given array were spoken
by the experimenter, the patient was required to point to their written
instantiations, until all words in the array had been spoken. Results revealed
decreased correct responding for concrete, but not abstract, arrays as compared
to controls, confirming one half of DRF's claim. Moreover, error rates increased
with successive spoken words in all trials, implying a build-up of semantic
interference. Experiment 5 used the same procedure as Experiment 4, except
with test arrays organized by semantic association instead of semantic similarity,
e.g., abstract: exercise, healthy, fitness, jogging; concrete: farm, cow, tractor,
barn. Results revealed decreased correct responding for abstract, but not
concrete, arrays compared to controls, confirming the other half of DRF's claim.
A second neuropsychological study (Crutch & Warrington, 2007) tested a patient
with deep-phonological dyslexia. Here, the patient was required to read arrays of
concepts organized in a fashion similar to the previous study. Results again
revealed an effect of semantic similarity upon processing of concrete, but not
abstract, concepts, and an effect of semantic association upon processing of
abstract, but not concrete, concepts. Notably, the effect here was a facilitation,
rather than interference, effect. A third neuropsychological study (Crutch &
Warrington, 2010) replicated the results from the previous two studies—i.e.,
interference during spoken word-written word matching and facilitation during
word reading—with a global aphasic patient. DRF's claims have also been
confirmed outside of neuropsychology. For example, using a visual world
paradigm, Duñabeitia, Avilés, Afonso, Scheepers, and Carreiras (2009) found
that abstract words draw more and quicker attention to pictures of semantically
dissimilar associates (e.g., smell ® picture of a nose) than do concrete words
(e.g., crib ® picture of a baby).
But despite the summarized findings, a number of studies have also failed to
support DRF (e.g., Marques & Nunes, 2012; Zhang, Han, & Bi, 2013; Hill,
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Korhonen, & Bentz, 2014; Benko, 2015; Ferré, Guasch, García-Chico, &
Sánchez-Casas, 2015). Among these, the aforementioned study by Marques and
Nunes (2012) as well as a study by Hill et al. (2014)—because of their reliance
on word association—are uniquely relevant to this thesis.
In Marques and Nunes' (2012) study, word association pairs were selected from
the University of South Florida free association norms (Nelson et al., 1998). The
particular word association pairs that were selected were the two most commonly
produced pairs for each of 47 abstract and 47 concrete concepts (which served
as stimulus words and were all nouns). Analyses performed on these pairs
revealed that they more often exhibited semantic similarity (i.e., contained
"synonyms, superordinates, category coordinates, and subordinates") when
produced for abstract than concrete concepts, which is the exact opposite of
what DRF predicts. Analyses also revealed that pairs more often exhibited
semantic association (i.e., contained "thematic or situational associates and
forward and backward completions") when produced for concrete than abstract
concepts, again contradicting DRF. These results were replicated in a second
experiment, which used the same concepts (i.e., stimulus words) alongside
newly collected response words.
In Hill et al.'s (2014) study, word association pairs and their forward association
probabilities were taken from the University of South Florida free association
norms (Nelson et al., 1998). Forward association probabilities (also known as
forward cue-to-target strengths) are probabilities of generating a given response
word from a given stimulus word (more on this in Section 2.1). Each word
association pair was assigned a score that reflected the semantic similarity of its
stimulus and response words (based on their proximity in WordNet; Felbaum,
1998). A multiple regression with forward association probability as a dependent
variable, and stimulus word concreteness rating, semantic similarity score, and
their interaction as predictors was conducted to test the following DRF-inspired
prediction:
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If concrete concepts are organized in the mind to a greater extent than
abstract concepts according to similarity, then the associates of a given
concrete concept should be more similar to that concept than the
associates of a given abstract concept (Hill et al., 2014, p. 167-168).
What this prediction says, in other words, is that semantic similarity scores and
forward association probabilities should pattern more similarly for a concrete
stimulus word and its response words than for an abstract stimulus word and its
response words.
Both semantic similarity and the interaction were significant positive predictors of
forward association probability. However, because the interaction accounted for
only a very minimal amount of variance in forward association probability over
semantic similarity alone (i.e., less than 0.1%), the authors decided there was
insufficient evidence for their prediction. That is, concrete concepts were not
found to be more similar to their associates than abstract concepts.
In summary, DRF (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010) departs from DCT
and PSS in several ways. For example, it is best characterized as a theory about
abstract/concrete concept representation, rather than one that relies on
abstract/concrete concept representation to substantiate more general claims.
DRF's main claim is that "abstract words have a relatively greater dependence
than concrete words upon representations of semantic association and that
concrete words have a relatively greater dependence than abstract words upon
representations of similarity-based information" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p.
47). There exists empirical evidence both for and against this claim.
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CHAPTER 2
USING WORD ASSOCIATION

2.1 WHY WE USE WORD ASSOCIATION
In word association, a stimulus word is presented to an individual who must then
provide, based on what comes to mind, a response word (Jung, 1969; Nelson et
al., 1998). For example, presented with 'walnut', an individual may respond
'acorn'. Because stimulus and response words are often conceptually—and not
just associatively—related (McRae, Khalkhali, & Hare, 2012), word association
may provide insight into how concepts are represented. Yet little work has drawn
upon it in examining the abstract/concrete distinction.
The present study uses word association to test hypotheses related to the
abstract/concrete distinction, each derived from one of the four theories
discussed in Chapter 1. In doing so, it assumes—like the earlier discussed
studies by Marques and Nunes (2012) and Hill et al. (2014)—that populationlevel word association statistics reflect how concepts are represented within
individuals. It is unknown to what extent this assumption is justified, but word
association statistics collected from populations have been found to correlate
highly with those collected from individuals (Cofer, 1958).

2.2 HOW WE USE WORD ASSOCIATION
2.2.1 WORD ASSOCIATION PAIRS AND CONCEPTS
We relied on the University of South Florida Free Association norms (Nelson et
al., 1998) for our word association data. The USF norms contain 5,019 stimulus
words with roughly 750,000 associated response words. To obtain these data,
over 6,000 participants performed a specific type of word association known as
discrete association, which receives its name from the fact that participants
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provide only a single response word to each stimulus word (Nelson et al., 1998)7.
In Nelson et al.'s (1998) discrete association task, participants were required to
"write the first word that came to mind that was meaningfully related or strongly
associated to the presented word".
The USF collection includes approximately thirty types of data, which are made
available for all stimulus-response pairs—henceforth referred to as word
association pairs—produced by at least two participants. The two-participant
criterion was selected because idiosyncratic pairs are highly unreliable (Nelson et
al., 1998). The present study uses the following five pieces of data: (1) cue8,
which refers to the stimulus word, e.g., walnut-acorn; (2) target, which refers to
the response word, e.g., walnut-acorn; (3) group size, which refers to the number
of participants presented with the stimulus word, e.g., 147 participants were
shown walnut; (4) forward cue-to-target strength (FSG), which refers to the
quotient obtained from dividing the number of participants who produced the
response word of the pair under consideration by its "group size", e.g., shown
walnut, 2 (out of 147) participants wrote acorn, therefore the FSG of walnut-acorn
is 2/147 = .014; and (5) cue part-of-speech, which refers to the dominant or only
part of speech to which the stimulus word belongs, e.g., walnut is a noun.
We collected these data for 1764 word association pairs spanning 38 very
abstract, 37 abstract, and 37 concrete concepts (i.e., cues; see Appendix A and
B). The purpose of including two levels of abstract concepts was two-fold. First,
we wanted to ensure adequate separation between abstract and concrete
concepts, while at the same time covering a broad range of concreteness ratings.
Had we included only an abstract and concrete group, we would risk missing an
effect due to potentially inadequate separation between our abstract and
concrete groups. Had we included only a very abstract and concrete group, we
7

Discrete association is contrasted with continuous association, which has independent participants
produce multiple responses to stimulus words (e.g., Santos et al., 2011). Continuous association can
be problematic when subsequent responses are based on previous responses rather than on the
stimulus word (i.e., "response chaining"; Nelson, McEvoy, & Dennis, 2000).
8

"Cues" are cues to concepts. Therefore, we use the terms "cue" and "concept" interchangeably.
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would be ignoring a large range of medium concreteness concepts. Second, we
reasoned that we may gain insight into the two-factor model of abstractness
(Wiemer-Hastings, Krug, & Xu, 2001), which says that:
First, entities are abstract or concrete, depending on whether they are
physical in nature (i.e., perceivable through vision, touch, etc.). Second,
within these groups, abstractness varies according to more specific types
of information (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001, p. 1134).
Evidence points to this model applying principally to abstract concepts, whose
abstractness appears to vary according to introspective information (WiemerHastings et al., 2001). That is, abstract concepts that are more abstract appear to
be less constrained by introspective information.
To determine which specific concepts we would collect data for, we used two
separate procedures; one for very abstract/abstract concepts and another for
concrete concepts. Very abstract and abstract concepts began as a single group
of concepts. These concepts were randomly selected from the USF database
and then cross-referenced with Brysbaert et al. (2014) to ensure they had
concreteness scores lower than 3.3 (out of max 5). We avoided concepts whose
meanings we intuitively felt people might be unsure of. To create separate very
abstract and abstract groups, we split the 75 concepts we collected based on
their median concreteness score. This produced 38 very abstract concepts with
concreteness scores from 1.25 to 2.13, and 37 abstract concepts with
concreteness scores from 2.17 to 3.24.
Initially, we had planned to conduct supplementary analyses using the McRae,
Cree, Seidenberg, and McNorgan norms (2005), and so our concrete concepts
were chosen from across the various categories in those norms (e.g., animals,
tools), with the constraint that they appear in the Nelson et al. (1998) norms. In
one case, a plural form of a concept was selected from the McRae et al. (2005)
norms but appeared only in its singular form in the Nelson et al. (1998) norms
(i.e., boot). The concept was retained. This procedure worked out well as McRae
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et al. (2005) items tended to have high concreteness ratings, ensuring adequate
separation from the abstract group. We collected a total of 34 concepts from the
McRae et al. (2005) norms. To reach 37 concepts, three more were randomly
selected from Nelson et al. (1998) and cross-referenced with Brysbaert et al.
(2014) to ensure they had concreteness scores above 4 (max 5). Concreteness
scores for our concrete concepts ranged from 4.11 to 5.00.
We compared our groups of concepts on several measures using univariate
analyses with concept type (i.e., very abstract, abstract, and concrete) as a
between-subjects factor. These included: group size, ln(frequency), familiarity
ratings, and imageability ratings. A concept's group size refers to the number of
participants that were presented with it in Nelson et al.'s (1998) word association
norms. A concept's ln(frequency) refers to the natural logarithm of its number of
occurrences in a given corpus—in this case, the SUBTLEXUS corpus, which
consists of 51 million words drawn from the subtitles of over 8000 movies and
television shows (Brysbaert & New, 2009). A concept's familiarity refers to
participants' assessments about how often it is seen, heard, or used (Gilhooly &
Logie, 1980). Familiarity ratings were taken from the MRC psycholinguistic
database (Coltheart, 1981). A concept's imageability refers to participants'
assessments of the ease/difficulty with which the concept evokes a mental image
such as a picture or sound (Paivio et al., 1968). Imageability ratings were taken
from the MRC psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981). Analyses of group
size and ln(frequency) were based on all 112 concepts. Analyses of familiarity
and imageability were based on the 106 and 107 concepts for which the MRC
database contained familiarity and imageability ratings, respectively. Main effects
indicating differences among concept types were found for ln(frequency),
familiarity, and imageability, but not group size (Table 2).
Table 2. Results from univariate analyses conducted on several measures related to our concepts
Effect
df
F
p
Group Size
2, 109
1.575
.212
ln(frequency)
2, 109
**10.968
.000
Familiarity
2, 103
**5.717
.004
Imageability
2, 104
**189.950
.000
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01
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The main effect of concept type on ln(frequency) was assessed with LSD tests.
Concrete concepts (M = 6.297, SE = 1.398) were less frequent than very abstract
concepts (M = 7.494, SE = 1.596), p = .001, and abstract concepts (M = 7.852,
SE = 1.486), p < .001. Very abstract and abstract concepts did not differ, p =
.302. We save the implications of these findings for the General Discussion.
The main effect of concept type on familiarity was also assessed with LSD tests.
Concrete concepts (M = 531.147, SE = 49.047) were rated as less familiar than
very abstract concepts (M = 550.541, SE = 29.064), p = .028, and abstract
concepts (M = 560.514, SE = 28.994), p = .001. We save the implications of
these findings for the General Discussion. However, note that the difference in
familiarity between concrete concepts and the two sets of abstract concepts was
small; approximately 20 to 30 on a 700-point scale. In addition, all three concepts
types produced generally high ratings. In fact, the least familiar words used in our
study were canoe and saxophone. Therefore, it appears that participants were
quite familiar with all 112 concepts, as intended. Very abstract and abstract
concepts did not differ in familiarity, p = .251.
The main effect of concept type on imageability was also assessed with LSD
tests. Concrete concepts (M = 604.735, SE = 26.513) were rated as more
imageable than both very abstract concepts (M = 341.946, SE = 58.676), p <
.001, and abstract concepts (M = 398.694, SE = 79.110), p < .001. Furthermore,
abstract concepts were rated as more imageable than very abstract concepts, p
< .001. The main effect of concept type on imageability was expected because
concreteness and imageability ratings tend to be correlated, as was the case with
our data, r = .875, p < .001. In fact, both have been used in past research to
distinguish between abstract and concrete concepts (e.g., Binder et al., 2005).
We also examined how parts of speech were distributed within our three concept
types. Among our 38 very abstract concepts, 14 were nouns, 8 were verbs, and
16 were adjectives. Among our 37 abstract concepts, 15 were nouns, 8 were
verbs, 13 were adjectives, and 1 was an adverb. Among our 37 concrete
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concepts, 36 were nouns and 1 was a verb. These distributions appear to mirror,
at least roughly, natural distributions of parts of speech across levels of
concreteness. We save the implications of these findings for the General
Discussion.

2.2.2 CLASSES, SYSTEMS, AND TYPES OF RELATIONS
Using a scheme modified from Wu and Barsalou (2009; Appendix C), two
independent coders assigned each word association pair to one of the following
"classes" based on the relationship between its cue and target (see Appendix B):
categorical, entity-based, introspective, lexical, or situational. The categorical
class contained word association pairs in which targets were categorically related
to the cue in various ways. This included, for example, superordinates as in
'drum-instrument', or categorical coordinates as in 'walnut-acorn'. The entitybased class contained pairs in which targets were concrete entity properties of
cues. This included, for example, external surface properties as in 'bed-soft', or
internal components as in 'apple-core'. The introspective class contained pairs in
which targets were mental states related to cues. This included, for example,
emotional states as in 'relief-happy', or evaluations as in 'challenge-difficult'. The
lexical class contained pairs in which targets were purely lexical associates of
cues. This included, for example, morphological associates as in 'luck-lucky', or
forward compound continuations as in 'relief-fund'. Finally, the situational class
contained pairs in which targets were related to cues through situations or types
of events. This included, for example, actions as in 'crisis-cry', or people as in
'advice-mother'. Coders had the option of skipping word association pairs if they
felt that the scheme did not accommodate them.
A third coder resolved discrepancies between the two initial coders, and provided
class assignments for any word association pairs that were skipped. The third
coder then reviewed all resolved assignments and made any changes that were
considered necessary. Of the 1764 resolved assignments, 363 were changed
before being finalized. In this way, assignments were ultimately up to the third

26
coder's discretion, although they may have been inspired by the initial coders.
We use classes primarily to test predictions based on PSS, which follows from
earlier work having done so successfully in conjunction with both property
generation (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu,
2005) and word association (Marques & Nunes, 2012). Additionally, we use
classes as shortcuts for assigning word association pairs to DCT and PSS/LASS
systems, which we discuss next.
Each word association pair was assigned to the nonverbal/simulation system,
verbal/linguistic system, or both. Note that DCT and PSS/LASS systems were
combined because we assumed that the nonverbal and simulation systems as
well as the verbal and linguistic systems would give rise to equivalent word
association pairs. Marques and Nunes (2012) make a similar assumption when
discussing their results (p. 1273). We feel this is a natural assumption, given that
both the nonverbal and simulation systems process sensorimotor/perceptual
information, and both the verbal and linguistic systems process language-based
information.
Initially, assignments of word association pairs to systems were based on
experimenter intuition about which systems were responsible for the production
of their targets9. Because we assumed overlap between classes and systems,
assignments were made using the following rules/shortcuts: (1) categorical word
association pairs belong to the verbal/linguistic system, (2) entity-based word
association pairs belong to the nonverbal/simulation system, (3) introspective
word association pairs belong to the nonverbal/simulation system, (4) lexical
word association pairs belong to the verbal/linguistic system, and (5) situational
word association pairs belong to the nonverbal/simulation system. We later
decided to generate a second, more empirical, set of assignments that
considered Santos et al.'s (2011) finding in which taxonomic (i.e., categorical)
9

When we say that a system is responsible for a target, we mean that it is the system primarily
responsible for the choice of the target, not the last system to be active prior to the response. All
targets, because they are words, must ultimately pass through the verbal/linguistic system. However,
that does not mean that the verbal/linguistic system is always the main determinant of the target.
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target positions on a continuous word association task fell halfway between
linguistic (i.e., lexical) and object-situation (i.e., entity-based and situational)
target positions. Here, assignments were made using these rules/shortcuts
instead: (1) categorical word association pairs belong equally to both systems,
(2) entity-based word association pairs belong to the nonverbal/simulation
system, (3) introspective word association pairs belong to the
nonverbal/simulation system, (4) lexical word association pairs belong to the
verbal/linguistic system, and (5) situational word association pairs belong to the
nonverbal/simulation system. We considered dropping our intuition-based
assignments and analyzing only the more empirical Santos-based assignments.
However, because the two sets differed in only one respect (i.e., how categorical
word pairs were treated), they could be easily contrasted, and so we decided to
analyze both. Therefore, we make a distinction between systemsantos and
systemintuit. We use systems to test predictions based on DCT, PSS, and LASS,
which follows from earlier work having done so successfully (Marques and
Nunes, 2012; Santos et al., 2011).
Finally, each word association pair was labeled according to the semantic
relation of its cue and target (i.e., "type of relation"; see Appendix B) which could
be either semantically similar (i.e., cues and targets have similar meanings), or
semantically associated (i.e., cues and targets have different but associated
meanings). These labels relied on the subclasses in the scheme modified from
Wu and Barsalou (2009; see Appendix C). Inspired by Crutch and Warrington's
(2005, 2007) stimuli, we labeled word association pairs with synonymous, similar,
and coordinate cues and targets as semantically similar, and all other word
association pairs as semantically associated. Note that, unlike Marques and
Nunes (2012), we did not label pairs with subordinate or superordinate cues and
targets as semantically similar. We felt that Crutch and Warrington's stimuli
(2005, 2007) gave little indication to do so. We use types of relation to test
predictions based on DRF, which follows from earlier work having done so
successfully (e.g., Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010).
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2.2.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLES
There were two main dependent variables in our study. The first was the number
of unique word association pairs assigned to a given class, system, or type of
relation, produced for a given concept, with the constraint that only pairs
produced by at least two participants were considered. Two different procedures
were used to obtain this variable depending on whether unique word association
pairs under consideration were assigned to a given (1) class, systemintuit, or type
of relation, or (2) systemsantos. The procedure for obtaining numbers of unique
word association pairs assigned to a given class, systemintuit, or type of relation
produced for a given concept consisted simply of counting them. For example,
there were eight unique word association pairs assigned to the categorical class
(in short, eight unique categorical word association pairs) produced for 'walnut'.
The procedure for obtaining numbers of unique word association pairs assigned
to a given systemsantos was more involved. First, we counted the number of
unique non-categorical word association pairs assigned to a given systemsantos
produced for a given concept. For example, seven unique non-categorical word
association pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos system were
produced for 'walnut'. Then, we counted the number of unique categorical word
association pairs assigned to that same systemsantos produced for that same
concept, and divided this value by two (i.e., to reflect partial dependence on each
system, as per section 2.2.2). For example, eight unique categorical word
association pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos system were
produced for 'walnut', which divided by two, equals four such pairs. Finally, we
summed the non-categorical and categorical pairs. For example, seven plus four
equals eleven unique word association pairs assigned to
nonverbal/simulationsantos system (in short, eleven unique
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs) produced for 'walnut'.
The second dependent variable was the proportion of participants who produced
word association pairs assigned to a given class, system, or type of relation, for a
given concept, with the constraint that only pairs produced by at least two
participants were considered. As with the first dependent variable, two different
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procedures were used to obtain this variable depending on whether word
association pairs under consideration were assigned to a given (1) class,
systemintuit, or type of relation, or (2) systemsantos. The procedure for obtaining the
proportion of participants who produced word association pairs assigned to a
given class, systemintuit, or type of relation, for a given concept, consisted of
summing appropriate FSGs. For example, the three unique word association
pairs assigned to the entity-based class produced for 'walnut' had FSGs of .02,
.014, and .014 = .048, indicating that 4.8% of participants produced word
association pairs assigned to the entity-based class for 'walnut' (in short, 4.8% of
participants produced entity-based word association pairs for 'walnut'). The
procedure for obtaining the proportion of participants who produced word
association pairs assigned to a given systemsantos for a given concept was more
involved. First, we summed the FSGs of unique non-categorical word association
pairs assigned to a given systemsantos produced for a given concept. For example,
.088 + .048 + .048 + .02 + .014 + .014 + .014 = .246 for the seven unique noncategorical word association pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos
system produced for 'walnut'. Then, we summed the FSGs of unique categorical
word association pairs assigned to that same systemsantos produced for that same
concept, and divided this value by two (i.e., to reflect partial dependence on each
system, as per section 2.2.2). For example, (.204 + .17 + .095 + .041 + .02 +
.014 + .014 + .014) / 2 = .286 for the eight unique categorical word association
pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos system produced for 'walnut'.
Finally, we summed the non-categorical and categorical summed FSGs. For
example, .246 plus .286 equals .532, indicating that 53.2% of participants
produced word association pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos
system for 'walnut' (in short, 53.2% of participants produced
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs for 'walnut').
Note that while we refer to our second dependent variable as "the proportion of
participants...", it is more accurately an "estimation of the proportion of
participants...". This is because it excludes FSGs for idiosyncratic word
association pairs in its calculation, which if included may increase its value.
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Admittedly, analyses conducted on proportions that consider FSGs of
idiosyncratic word association pairs may offer different results than what we
present. This is especially the case for analyses that compare across concept
types, because proportions of participants who produced non-idiosyncratic word
association pairs were, on average, smaller for very abstract (M = .745, SE =
.011) and abstract (M = .766, SE = .015) concepts than for concrete concepts (M
= .871, SE = .011).
We include both of these dependent variables, rather than one or the other,
because it is unknown which is a more accurate approximation of conceptual
representation (be that in general or with respect to a specific class, system, or
type of relation). It is sensible to assume that a word association pair produced
by a large number of participants lends greater insight into how a concept is
represented than does a word association pair generated by only a few
participants. However, there is no assurance that this is actually the case.
Consider, for example, that fork is a more frequent target for knife than is cut. It is
hard to imagine that a fork is more central to the meaning of knife than is the act
of cutting. Deese (1965) provides relevant commentary (albeit in the context of
data collected from continuous association tasks):
...the concept of associative strength seems misapplied to structures of
meaning for individuals. Strength, or more precisely, frequency, has an
important meaning when one considers populations of individuals and
when one wishes to characterize the general meanings of words existing
within that population. A meaning possessed by a single individual ought
to have less influence in the description of the generalized meaning for the
population than a meaning shared by a number of individuals. For a single
individual, however, either a word is part of the associative meaning for
another word or it is not. To be sure, meanings will fluctuate both
systematically and quasi-randomly in time, but in the determination at any
given time either a meaning is there or it is not (Deese, 1965, p. 175).
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Finally, as a point of reference, we include figures that compare the average
values of our dependent variables assigned to each class (Figure 4), system
(Figure 5), and type of relation (Figure 6), for each concept type.

Figure 4. Average number of unique word association pairs produced for each class (Panel A) and
average proportion of participants who produced word association pairs for each class (Panel B).

Figure 5. Average number of unique word association pairs produced by each systemsantos (Panel A)
and systemintuit (Panel C), and average proportion of participants who produced word association pairs
using each systemsantos (Panel B) and systemintuit (Panel D).
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Figure 6. Average number of unique word association pairs produced containing each type of relation
(Panel A) and average proportion of participants who produced word association pairs containing each
type of relation (Panel B).
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CHAPTER 3
TESTING THE THEORIES

3.1 TESTING DUAL CODING THEORY (DCT)
3.1.1 HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS
Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007) argues that abstract concepts are
represented in the verbal but not the nonverbal system, whereas concrete
concepts are represented in both. Based on this idea, we generated the
predictions shown in Table 3, which are repeated using systemssantos (P1-P8) and
systemsintuit (P9-P16). These particular predictions were generated because they
represent the simplest predictions that follow logically from DCT. We avoided, for
example, the prediction that "larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word
association pairs were produced for very abstract than concrete concepts"
because, despite its simplicity, it does not follow logically from DCT10.
Table 3. Predictions based on DCT (P1-P16)
Prediction #
Prediction
P1, P9
Larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were
produced for concrete than very abstract concepts.

10

P2, P10

Larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were
produced for concrete than abstract concepts.

P3, P11

Larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic than nonverbal/simulation word
association pairs were produced for very abstract concepts.

P4, P12

Larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic than nonverbal/simulation word
association pairs were produced for abstract concepts.

P5, P13

Larger proportions of participants produced nonverbal/simulation word association
pairs for concrete than very abstract concepts.

P6, P14

Larger proportions of participants produced nonverbal/simulation word association
pairs for concrete than abstract concepts.

P7, P15

Larger proportions of participants produced verbal/linguistic than
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for very abstract concepts.

P8, P16

Larger proportions of participants produced verbal/linguistic than
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for abstract concepts.

DCT's hypotheses do not imply that abstract concepts receive greater representation in the verbal
system than do concrete concepts—only that they receive greater representation in the verbal system
relative to the nonverbal system than do concrete concepts.
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3.1.2 ANALYSES AND RESULTS
A 3 (concept type: very abstract, abstract, concrete) x 2 (systemsantos:
nonverbal/simulationsantos, verbal/linguisticsantos) repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted using numbers of unique systemsantos word association pairs
produced. Unrelated to our predictions, we found main effects of systemsantos,
F(1, 109) = 314.830, p < .001. and concept type, F(2, 109) = 5.393, p = .006. The
main effect of systemsantos was due to larger numbers of unique
nonverbal/simulationsantos (M = 11.509) than verbal/linguisticsantos (M = 4.241)
pairs produced. The main effect of concept type was due to larger numbers of
unique pairs produced per system for very abstract concepts (M = 8.737) than
concrete concepts (M = 6.959), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Related to our predictions,
we failed to find a systemsantos x concept type interaction, F(2, 109) = 0.486, p =
.616. This interaction would have signaled the possibility that different numbers
of unique nonverbal/simulationsantos pairs were produced between at least two
concept types, consistent with predictions 1 and 2. It would also have signaled
the possibility that different numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationsantos and
verbal/linguisticsantos pairs were produced within at least one concept type,
consistent with predictions 3 and 4. Predictions 1-4 were, therefore, unconfirmed.
A 3 (concept type) x 2 (systemsantos) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted
using proportions of participants who produced systemsantos word association
pairs. Unrelated to our predictions, we found main effects of systemsantos, F(1,
109) = 176.728, p < .001, and concept type, F(2, 109) = 30.389, p < .001. The
main effect of systemsantos was due to larger proportions of participants producing
nonverbal/simulationsantos (M = .540) than verbal/linguisticsantos (M = .254) pairs.
The main effect of concept type was due to larger proportions of participants
producing pairs per system for concrete concepts (M = .436) than very abstract
concepts (M = .373), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, as well as abstract concepts (M =
.383), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Related to our predictions, we found a systemsantos x
concept type interaction, F(2, 109) = 4.961, p = .009. This interaction signaled
the possibility that proportions of participants who produced
nonverbal/simulationsantos pairs differed between at least two concept types,
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consistent with predictions 5 and 6. It also signaled the possibility that
proportions of participants who produced nonverbal/simulationsantos and
verbal/linguisticsantos pairs differed within at least one concept type, consistent
with predictions 7 and 8. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted on the
interaction. Predictions 5 and 6 were confirmed. Larger proportions of
participants produced nonverbal/simulationsantos pairs for concrete concepts (M =
.618) than for both very abstract concepts (M = .473), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, and
abstract concepts (M = .530), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Predictions 7 and 8,
however, were unconfirmed. In fact, larger proportions of participants produced
nonverbal/simulationsantos than verbal/linguisticsantos pairs for very abstract
concepts (M = .473 versus M = .272), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, as well as abstract
concepts (M = .530 versus M = .236), TUKEY HSD: p < .01.
A 3 (concept type) x 2 (systemintuit) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted
using numbers of unique systemintuit word association pairs produced. Unrelated
to our predictions, we found a main effect of systemintuit, F(1, 109) = 4.258, p =
.041, as well as a previously seen main effect of concept type. The main effect of
systemintuit was due to larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationintuit (M =
8.429) than verbal/linguisticintuit (M = 7.321) pairs. Related to our predictions, we
found a systemintuit x concept type interaction, F(2, 109) = 4.265, p = .016. This
interaction signaled the possibility that different numbers of unique
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced between at least
two concept types, consistent with predictions 9 and 10. It also signaled the
possibility that different numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationintuit and
verbal/linguisticintuit word association pairs were produced within at least one
concept type, consistent with predictions 11 and 12. Accordingly, TUKEY tests
were conducted on the interaction. Predictions 9 and 10 were unconfirmed. It
was not the case that larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationintuit word
association pairs were produced for concrete concepts (M = 8.189) than for very
abstract concepts (M = 8.184) or abstract concepts (M = 8.919). Predictions 11
and 12 were also unconfirmed. It was not the case that larger numbers of unique
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were
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produced for very abstract concepts (M = 9.289 versus M = 8.184) or abstract
concepts (M = 6.892 versus M = 8.919).
A 3 (concept type) x 2 (systemintuit) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted
using proportions of participants who produced systemintuit word association pairs.
Unrelated to our predictions, we found a main effect of systemintuit, F(1, 109) =
8.980, p = .003, as well as a previously seen main effect of concept type. The
main effect of systemintuit was due to larger proportions of participants producing
nonverbal/simulationintuit (M = .455) than verbal/linguisticintuit (M = .339) word
association pairs. Related to our predictions, we found a systemintuit x concept
type interaction, F(2, 109) = 3.417, p = .036. This interaction signaled the
possibility that proportions of participants who produced nonverbal/simulationintuit
word association pairs differed between at least two concept types, consistent
with predictions 13 and 14. It also signaled the possibility that proportions of
participants who produced nonverbal/simulationintuit and verbal/linguisticintuit word
association pairs differed within at least one concept type, consistent with
predictions 15 and 16. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted on the
interaction. Prediction 13, but not 14, was confirmed. Larger proportions of
participants produced nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for
concrete concepts (M = .437) than for very abstract concepts (M = .251), TUKEY
HSD: p < .01, but not abstract concepts (M = .330). Similarly, prediction 15, but
not 16, was confirmed. Larger proportions of participants produced
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very
abstract concepts (M = .494 versus M = .251), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, but not
abstract concepts (M = .436 versus M = .330).

3.1.3 DISCUSSION
Table 4 summarizes all of the predictions based on DCT, as well as the state of
evidence for or against them. None of the predictions tested using numbers of
unique word association pairs produced were confirmed. In contrast, several of
the predictions tested using proportions of participants who produced word
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Table 4. Summary of evidence for DCT predictions (P1-P16)
Predictions
Evidence
Predictions
Evidence
#s of unique pairs (systemsantos)
#s of unique pairs (systemintuit)
P1 NV/S: C > VA
No
P9 NV/S: C > VA
No
P2 NV/S: C > A
No
P10 NV/S: C > A
No
P3 VA: V/L > NV/S
No
P11 VA: V/L > NV/S
No
P4 A: V/L > NV/S
No
P12 A: V/L > NV/S
No
Proportions of participants (systemsantos)
Proportions of participants (systemintuit)
P5 NV/S: C > VA
Yes
P13 NV/S: C > VA
Yes
P6 NV/S: C > A
Yes
P14 NV/S: C > A
No
P7 VA: V/L > NV/S
Opposite (VA: V/L < NV/S)
P15 VA: V/L > NV/S
Yes
P8 A: V/L > NV/S
Opposite (A: V/L < NV/S)
P16 A: V/L > NV/S
No
Note. VA = Very Abstract, A = Abstract, C = Concrete, NV/S = Nonverbal/Simulation, V/L = Verbal/
Linguistic

association pairs were confirmed. This discrepancy might indicate that
proportions of participants who produced word association pairs are more
sensitive measures of conceptual representation than are numbers of unique
word association pairs produced. Focusing on proportions of participants, we see
that several analogous analyses using systemssantos and systemsintuit give
conflicting results (i.e., P6 and P14, P7 and P15, and P8 and P16). First,
analyses using systemssantos (P6) revealed that larger proportions of participants
produced nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for concrete than abstract
concepts, whereas analyses using systemsintuit (P14) failed to reveal this.
Second, analyses using systemssantos (P7) revealed that larger proportions of
participants produced nonverbal/simulation than verbal/linguistic word
association pairs for very abstract concepts, whereas analyses using systemsintuit
(P15) revealed the opposite (which was the prediction). Third, analyses using
systemssantos (P8) revealed that larger proportions of participants produced
nonverbal/simulation than verbal/linguistic word association pairs for abstract
concepts, whereas analyses using systemsintuit (P16) failed to reveal this (or the
opposite, which was the prediction). We offer two explanations for these results.
The first explanation assumes that systemssantos are accurate in the extent to
which they assign categorical word association pairs to the verbal/linguistic
system. In this case, the observed results may be due to predictions 7 and 8
overlooking the role of mediation processes in DCT (see Paivio, 2007, p. 101102). Possibly, that analyses for P7 and P8 revealed significant results in the
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direction opposite to that expected was due to the following mediation process:
(1) abstract concept verbal information activates concrete concept verbal
information (e.g., cue/word: danger ® word: highway), (2) concrete concept
verbal information activates concrete concept nonverbal information (e.g., word:
highway ® image: a sign), (3) concrete concept nonverbal information activates
concrete concept verbal information (e.g., image: a sign ® word: sign), (4)
concrete concept verbal information initiates a response (e.g., word: sign ®
target/word: sign). However, cases such as "danger ® sign" appear to be rare in
our data. Moreover, it is difficult to tell if reaction time findings are consistent with
this process. Paivio, Clark, Digdon, and Bons (1989) found that it took around 1.1
seconds for words to be imaged (i.e., for the verbal system to activate the
nonverbal system and produce a behavioral response). This is less than, for
example, the 1.6 second average word association reaction time found by
Wallenhorst (1965)11, and so the mediation process above is not ruled out.
However, most of the words in Paivio et al. (1989) were object words (i.e.,
concrete). Because starting with concrete words effectively skips step 1, 1.1
seconds is probably an underestimation of how long the process takes. In reality,
it might take longer than 1.6 seconds. Finally, whether a mediation process is
even tenable is unknown. For example, the earlier discussed findings linking
abstract concepts directly to nonverbal processing (e.g., Wilson-Mendenhall et
al., 2013; McRae et al., 2017) make such a process redundant.
The second explanation assumes that systemsintuit are accurate in the extent to
which they assign categorical word association pairs to the verbal/linguistic
system. In this case, a real difference between very abstract and abstract
concept representation may account for the fact that (1) larger proportions of
participants produced nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for
concrete than very abstract (P13), but not abstract (P14), concepts, and (2)
larger proportions of participants produced verbal/linguisticintuit than
11

It is also less than Jung's finding of a 1.95 second average for universal concepts, for which no
description is given but which are contrasted with concrete concepts (M = 1.67 seconds) and
presumably similar to abstract concepts (Jung, 1969, p. 235).
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nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very abstract (P15), but not
abstract (P16), concepts. This is in line with the two-factor model of abstractness,
which says that there is a distinction between different types of abstract concepts
(Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001).

3.2 TESTING PERCEPTUAL SYMBOL SYSTEMS (PSS)
3.2.1 HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS
In contrast to DCT, PSS argues that abstract concepts are represented in a
nonverbal/simulation system (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). Furthermore, PSS argues
that the focus in this system might be different for abstract and concrete concepts
(Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Simulations related to abstract concepts
might focus on introspective and setting/event properties of situations, whereas
those related to concrete concepts might focus on critical objects and their
properties. Accordingly, we generated the predictions in Table 5, which use
systemsintuit (P17-18, P22-23) and classes (P19-21, P24-26). In generating these
predictions, we assumed that simulations of introspective properties and critical
objects/their properties produced word association pairs from the introspective
and entity-based classes, respectively. We generated predictions 17, 18, 22, and
23 because they test the most basic assumption that distinguishes PSS from
DCT. Note that these predictions used systemsintuit but not systemssantos. This is
because they address only the nonverbal/simulation system, and systemsintuit
offer the most conservative definition of this system. Any significant results hold
for systemssantos. We generated the rest of our predictions with the goal of
making within-concept type comparisons to contrast with Barsalou and WiemerHastings (2005) between-concept type comparisons. This required interpreting
the term "focus" in a specific way. Now, for simulations related to a given concept
type (e.g., abstract) to focus on a given property type (e.g., introspective), all that
was required was that said property type (e.g., introspective) be more important
to said simulations than at least one other property type (e.g., entity-based).
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Accordingly, we planned to compare pairs of classes. We left out comparisons
involving the categorical and lexical classes because we characterize their word
association pairs as belonging only partly, or else not at all, to the simulation
system. We also left out comparisons involving the situational class because: (1)
we wanted to limit our already large number of predictions, and (2) Barsalou and
Wiemer-Hastings (2005) found setting/event (i.e., situational) properties to
dominate every concept type, so using them would be unlikely to teach us
anything new. Therefore, we were left with one comparison per concept type,
each involving introspective and entity-based classes.
Table 5. Predictions based on PSS (P17-P26)
Prediction #
Prediction
P17
More than zero unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were produced for
very abstract concepts.
P18

More than zero unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were produced for
abstract concepts.

P19

Larger numbers of unique introspective than entity-based word association pairs were
produced for very abstract concepts.

P20

Larger numbers of unique introspective than entity-based word association pairs were
produced for abstract concepts.

P21

Larger numbers of unique entity-based than introspective word association pairs were
produced for concrete concepts.

P22

Non-zero proportions of participants produced nonverbal/simulation word association
pairs for very abstract concepts.

P23

Non-zero proportions of participants produced nonverbal/simulation word association
pairs for abstract concepts.

P24

Larger proportions of participants produced introspective than entity-based word
association pairs for very abstract concepts.

P25

Larger proportions of participants produced introspective than entity-based word
association pairs for abstract concepts.

P26

Larger proportions of participants produced entity-based than introspective word
association pairs for concrete concepts.

3.2.2 ANALYSES AND RESULTS
A one-sample t-test was conducted using numbers of unique
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very abstract concepts.
Prediction 17 was confirmed. More than zero unique nonverbal/simulationintuit
word association pairs were produced for very abstract concepts (M = 8.184, SE
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= .672), t(37) = 12.171, p < .001. A one-sample t-test was also conducted on
numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for abstract
concepts. Prediction 18 was confirmed. More than zero unique
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced for abstract
concepts (M = 8.919, SE = .749), t(36) = 11.912, p < .001.
A 3 (concept type) x 5 (class: categorical, entity-based, introspective, lexical,
situational) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using numbers of unique
word association pairs produced for each class. Unrelated to our predictions, we
found a main effect of class, F(4, 436) = 129.767, p < .001, as well as a
previously seen main effect of concept type. Trends in Panel A of Figure 4
suggest that the main effect of class was due to multiple differences between
multiple classes. Related to our predictions, we found a class x concept type
interaction, F(8, 436) = 18.281, p < .001. This interaction signaled the possibility
that different numbers of unique introspective and entity-based word association
pairs were produced within at least one concept type, consistent with predictions
19-21. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted on the interaction. Predictions
19 and 20 were confirmed. Larger numbers of unique introspective than entitybased word association pairs were produced for very abstract concepts (M =
2.289 versus M = .026), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, as well as abstract concepts (M =
2.135 versus M = .054), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Prediction 21 was also confirmed.
Larger numbers of unique entity-based than introspective words association pairs
were produced for concrete concepts (M = 3.730 versus M = .730), TUKEY HSD:
p < .01.
A one-sample t-test was conducted using proportions of participants who
produced nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very abstract
concepts. Prediction 22 was confirmed. Non-zero proportions of participants
produced unique nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very abstract
concepts (M = .251, SE = .144), t(37) = 10.723, p < .001. A one-sample t-test
was also conducted using proportions of participants who produced
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for abstract concepts. Prediction
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23 was confirmed. Non-zero proportions of participants produced unique
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for abstract concepts (M = .330,
SE = .213), t(36) = 9.430, p < .001.
A 3 (concept type) x 5 (class) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using
proportions of participants who produced word association pairs for each class.
Unrelated to our predictions, we found a main effect of class, F(4, 436) =
101.330, p < .001, as well as a previously seen main effect of concept type.
Trends in Panel B of Figure 4 suggest that the main effect of class is due to
multiple differences between multiple classes. Related to our predictions, we
found a class x concept type interaction, F(8, 436) = 4.233, p < .001. This
interaction signaled the possibility that different proportions of participants
produced introspective and entity-based word association pairs within at least
one concept type, consistent with predictions 24-26. Accordingly, TUKEY tests
were conducted on the interaction. Predictions 24 and 25 were unconfirmed. It
was not the case that larger proportions of participants produced introspective
than entity-based word association pairs for very abstract concepts (M = .067
versus M = .002) or abstract concepts (M = .075 versus M = .001). However,
prediction 26 was confirmed. Larger proportions of participants produced entitybased than introspective word association pairs for concrete concepts (M = .168
versus M = .061), TUKEY HSD: p < .01.

3.2.3 DISCUSSION
Table 6 summarizes all of the predictions based on PSS, as well as the state of
evidence for or against them.
Table 6. Summary of evidence for PSS predictions (P17-P26)
Predictions
Evidence
Predictions
Evidence
#s of unique pairs (nonverbal/simulationintuit)
Proportions of participants (nonverbal/simulationintuit)
P17 NV/S: VA > 0
Yes
P22 NV/S: VA > 0
Yes
P18 NV/S: A > 0
Yes
P23 NV/S: A > 0
Yes
#s of unique pairs (class)
Proportions of participants (class)
P19 VA: Intro > Entity
Yes
P24 VA: Intro > Entity
No
P20 A: Intro > Entity
Yes
P25 A: Intro > Entity
No
P21 C: Entity > Intro
Yes
P26 C: Entity > Intro
Yes
Note. VA = Very Abstract, A = Abstract, C = Concrete, NV/S = Nonverbal/Simulation
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All predictions tested using numbers of unique word association pairs produced
were confirmed. First, more than zero unique nonverbal/simulationintuit word
association pairs were produced for very abstract concepts (P17) as well as
abstract concepts (P18). These results suggest that abstract concepts are indeed
represented in a nonverbal/simulation system. Second, larger numbers of unique
introspective than entity-based word association pairs were produced for very
abstract concepts (P19) as well as abstract concepts (P20). Third, larger
numbers of unique entity-based than introspective words association pairs were
produced for concrete concepts (P21). These results suggest that the focus
within the nonverbal/simulation system is different for abstract and concrete
concepts, particularly in the manner proposed by PSS.
By contrast, three of five analyses using proportions of participants who
produced word association pairs were confirmed. Non-zero proportions of
participants produced nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very
abstract concepts (P22) as well as abstract concepts (P23), providing further
support to the idea that abstract concepts are represented in a
nonverbal/simulation system. Also, larger proportions of participants produced
entity-based than introspective word association pairs for concrete concepts
(P26). However, it was not the case that larger proportions of participants
produced introspective than entity-based word association pairs for very abstract
(P24) or abstract (P25) concepts.

3.3 TESTING LANGUAGE AND SITUATED SIMULATIONS (LASS)
3.3.1 HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS
Here we test a claim that is not motivated by the abstract/concrete distinction, but
may have implications related to it. LASS argues that when cues are words, as is
the case in word association, the verbal/linguistic system is activated before the
nonverbal/simulation system. Although we did not have reaction time data to test
this directly, a suitable proxy in the form of target commonality was available,
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because "more frequent responses [on word association tasks] are quicker" (i.e.,
Marbe's Law; Schlosberg & Heineman, 1950; see also Cason & Cason, 1925).
Therefore, we introduced a commonality variable.
We labeled each of our 1764 unique word association pairs common or
uncommon. Unique word association pairs were considered common if their
FSGs were greater than or equal to .022 (i.e., if they were generated by at least
2.2% of corresponding participants, which for most concepts meant around 3
participants) and uncommon if not. This criterion was chosen because it split our
1764 unique word association pairs as equally as possible (i.e., 858 common and
906 uncommon unique word association pairs). Then, we recalculated numbers
of unique nonverbal/simulationsantos, verbal/linguisticsantos, nonverbal/
simulationintuit, and verbal/linguisticintuit word association pairs using the same
procedures outlined in 2.2.3, but treating common and uncommon pairs as
separate sets. For example, three common unique non-categorical and four
common unique categorical nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs
were produced for 'walnut', so five (i.e., 3 + 4 / 2) common nonverbal/
simulationsantos word association pairs were produced for 'walnut'. Similarly, four
uncommon unique non-categorical and four uncommon unique categorical
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were produced for 'walnut', so
six (i.e., 4 + 4 / 2) uncommon nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs
were produced for 'walnut'.
In order to test LASS, we generated the predictions shown in Table 7, which are
repeated for systemssantos (P27) and systemsintuit (P28). In generating these
predictions, we reasoned that if verbal/linguistic system activation precedes
nonverbal/simulation system activation when cues are words, we should expect
the activity of the former compared to the latter to be larger at earlier as
compared to later time points. In addition to these predictions, but contingent on
their outcomes, we planned to investigate whether the commonality/time course
effect interacts with concept type. However, no specific prediction was made in
this regard.
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Table 7. Predictions and explorations based on LASS (P27-P28, E1-E2)
Pred. & Exp. #
Prediction & Exploration
P27, P28
Differences in numbers of common unique verbal/linguistic and
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs produced by participants are
more positive or less negative than difference in numbers of uncommon
unique verbal/linguistic and nonverbal/simulation word association pairs
produced by participants.
E1, E2

Does the commonality/time course effect differ across concept type? (this is
contingent on finding the effect in P27, P28).

3.3.2 ANALYSES AND RESULTS
A paired-sample t-test was conducted using numbers of unique systemsantos word
association pairs. The first sample reflected how much more or less active the
verbal/linguistic system was than the nonverbal/simulation system in producing
common unique word association pairs. It was obtained by subtracting—on a per
concept basis—the number of common unique verbal/linguisticsantos from
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs produced. For example, for
common unique word association pairs involving 'walnut', this was 1 – 1 = 0,
indicating that the two systems were equally active. The second sample reflected
how much more or less active the verbal/linguistic system was than the
nonverbal/simulation system in producing uncommon unique word association
pairs. It was obtained by subtracting—on a per concept basis—the number of
uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos from nonverbal/simulationsantos word
association pairs produced. For example, for uncommon word association pairs
involving 'walnut', this was 3 – 10 = -7, indicating that the nonverbal/simulation
system was more active than the verbal/linguistic system. Prediction 27 was
confirmed. Differences between numbers of unique verbal/linguisticsantos and
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were significantly less negative
among common (M = -3.089, SE = .235) than uncommon (M = -4.179, SE =
.296) unique word association pairs, t(111) = 3.154, p = .002. Put another way,
there was an average of 3.089 fewer common unique verbal/linguisticsantos than
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs, and an average of 4.179 fewer
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uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos than nonverbal/simulationsantos word
association pairs.
An analogous paired-sample t-test was conducted using numbers of unique
systemintuit word association pairs. Prediction 28 was confirmed. Differences
between numbers of verbal/linguisticintuit and nonverbal/simulationintuit word
association pairs were significantly more positive among common (M = .321, SE
= .332) than uncommon (M = -1.429, SE = .361) unique word association pairs,
t(111) = 4.319, p < .001. Put another way, there was an average of .321 more
common unique verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word
association pairs, and an average of 1.429 fewer uncommon unique
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs.
Explorations aimed at determining if the commonality effect differs by concept
type used data from the above analyses. A 3 (concept type) x 2 (commonality:
common unique verbal/linguisticsantos minus nonverbal/simulationsantos word
association pairs, uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos minus
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs) repeated measures ANOVA
was conducted. No concept x commonality interaction was found, F(2, 109) =
2.654, p = .075. Therefore, exploration 1 was unconfirmed. An analogous
ANOVA using systemintuit also revealed no concept x commonality interaction,
F(2, 109) = 1.608, p = .205. Therefore, exploration 2 was unconfirmed as well.
Because the FSG value we used to define common versus uncommon pairs was
selected somewhat arbitrarily (i.e., the only consideration was how equal in size
the two groups would be), we repeated our analyses using a different FSG value.
This time, unique word association pairs were considered common if their FSGs
were greater than or equal to .100 and uncommon if not. Prediction 27 was
reconfirmed. Differences between numbers of verbal/linguisticsantos and
nonverbal/simulationsantos unique word association pairs were significantly less
negative among common (M = -.545, SE = .095) than uncommon (M = -6.723,
SE = .399) unique word association pairs, t(111) = 15.003, p < .001. Put another
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way, there was an average of .545 fewer common unique verbal/linguisticsantos
than nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs, and an average of 6.723
fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos than nonverbal/simulationsantos
word association pairs. Prediction 28 was also reconfirmed. Differences between
numbers of verbal/linguisticintuit and nonverbal/simulationintuit unique word
association pairs were significantly more positive among common (M = .411, SE
= .139) than uncommon (M = -1.518, SE = .523) unique word association pairs,
t(111) = 3.706, p < .001. Put another way, there was an average of .411 more
common unique verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word
association pairs, and an average of 1.518 fewer uncommon unique
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs.
Furthermore, explorations using both systemsantos, F(2, 109) = 1.216, p = .300,
and systemintuit, F(2, 109) = 1.514, p = .225, once again revealed no interactions
between the commonality/time course effect and concept type.

3.3.3 DISCUSSION
Table 8 summarizes the predictions and explorations based on LASS, as well as
the state of evidence for or against them.
Table 8. Summary of evidence for LASS predictions (P27, P28) and explorations (E1, E2)
Predictions & Explorations
Evidence
COMMON FSG >= 0.022, UNCOMMON FSG < 0.022
#s of unique pairs (systemsantos)
P27
Common V/L - Common NV/S > Uncommon V/L - Uncommon NV/S
Yes
E1
Does the effect from P27 differ across concept type?
No
#s of unique pairs (systemintuit)
P28
Common V/L - Common NV/S > Uncommon V/L - Uncommon NV/S
Yes
E2
Does the effect from P28 differ across concept type?
No
COMMON FSG >= 0.100, UNCOMMON FSG < 0.100
#s of unique pairs (systemsantos)
P27-2 Common V/L - Common NV/S > Uncommon V/L - Uncommon NV/S
Yes
E1-2 Does the effect from P27 differ across concept type?
No
#s of unique pairs (systemintuit)
P28-2 Common V/L - Common NV/S > Uncommon V/L - Uncommon NV/S
Yes
E2-2 Does the effect from P28 differ across concept type?
No
Note. V/L = Verbal/Linguistic, NV/S = Nonverbal/Simulation

Prediction 27 was confirmed using two different criteria for word association pair
commonality. Under the first criterion, an average of 3.089 fewer common unique
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verbal/linguisticsantos than nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were
produced, and an average of 4.179 fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos
than nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were produced. Under the
second criterion, an average of .545 fewer common unique verbal/linguisticsantos
than nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were produced, and an
average of 6.723 fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos than
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were produced. Both of these
findings indicate that the inferior activity of the verbal/linguistic compared to
nonverbal/simulation system was less inferior in the production of common as
compared to uncommon word association pairs. Prediction 28 was also
confirmed using two different criteria for word association pair commonality.
Under the first criterion, an average of .321 more common unique
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were
produced, and an average of 1.429 fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticintuit
than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced. Under the
second criterion, an average of .411 more common unique verbal/linguisticintuit
than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced, and an
average of 1.518 fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticintuit than
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced. Both of these
findings indicate that the verbal/linguistic system was more active than the
nonverbal/simulation system for common word association pairs, but less active
for uncommon word association pairs.
Recalling that more frequent responses are quicker, results from both predictions
support LASS's claim that the linguistic system is activated before the simulation
system when cues are words. But, while predictions regarding a
commonality/time course effect were confirmed, explorations failed to find any
evidence that the effect is influenced by concept type. Therefore, we found
evidence for one of LASS's general claims, but failed to find evidence with
bearing on the abstract/concrete distinction.
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3.4 TESTING DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIONAL FRAMEWORKS (DRF)
3.4.1 HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS
Different Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010)
argues that "abstract words have a relatively greater dependence than concrete
words upon representations of semantic association and that concrete words
have a relatively greater dependence than abstract words upon representations
of similarity-based information" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 47). To generate
and test predictions based on this claim (Table 9), our semantic association and
semantic similarity measures were made relative to each other on a per concept
basis. For numbers of unique word association pairs produced, this was
achieved by dividing each concept's number of unique semantically associated
word association pairs produced by its number of unique semantically similar
plus semantically associated word association pairs produced. For example, for
'walnut', this was 9 / (9 + 6) = 0.600 = relative dependence on semantic
association based on numbers of unique word association pairs produced. For
proportions of participants who produced word association pairs, this was
achieved by dividing each concept's proportion of participants who produced
semantically associated word association pairs by its proportion of participants
who produced semantically similar plus semantically associated word association
Table 9. Predictions based on DRF (P29-P32)
Prediction #
Prediction
P29
Relative dependence based on #s of unique pairs: Very abstract concepts have a
greater relative dependence on semantic association than do concrete concepts «
Concrete concepts have a greater relative dependence on semantic similarity than do
very abstract concepts.
P30

Relative dependence based on #s of unique pairs: Abstract concepts have a greater
relative dependence on semantic association than do concrete concepts « Concrete
concepts have a greater relative dependence on semantic similarity than do abstract
concepts.

P31

Relative dependence based on proportions of participants: Very abstract concepts
have a greater relative dependence on semantic association than do concrete
concepts « Concrete concepts have a greater relative dependence on semantic
similarity than do very abstract concepts.

P32

Relative dependence based on proportions of participants: Abstract concepts have a
greater relative dependence on semantic association than do concrete concepts «
Concrete concepts have a greater relative dependence on semantic similarity than do
abstract concepts.
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pairs. For example, for 'walnut', this was .430 / (.388 + .430) = 0.526 = relative
dependence on semantic association based on proportions of participants who
produced word association pairs. With these measures of relative dependence,
we generated the predictions listed in Table 9, which correspond directly to
DRF's claims. Note that our measures have been relatively abstracted from their
original forms at this point. For this reason, we refer to them simply as measures
of "relative dependence".

3.4.2 ANALYSES AND RESULTS
A univariate analysis (concept x relative dependence on semantic association)
was conducted using measures of relative dependence on semantic association
based on numbers of unique pairs (alternatively, we could have used measures
of dependence on semantic similarity). A main effect of concept type was found,
F(2, 109) = 8.038, p = .001. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted on the
main effect. Contrary to prediction 29, very abstract concepts (M = .659/.341) had
a smaller/larger relative dependence on semantic association/similarity than did
concrete concepts (M = .810/.190), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Contrary to prediction
30, abstract concepts (M = .739/.261) and concrete concepts (M = .810/.190) did
not differ in their dependence on semantic association/similarity.
A univariate analysis (concept x relative dependence on semantic association)
was conducted using measures of relative dependence on semantic association
based on proportions of participants (again, we could have used measures of
dependence on semantic similarity). A main effect of concept type was found,
F(2, 109) = 10.209, p < .001. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted.
Contrary to prediction 31, very abstract concepts (M = .555/.445) had a
smaller/larger relative dependence on semantic association/similarity than did
concrete concepts (M = .797/.203), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Contrary to prediction
32, abstract concepts (M = .695/.305) and concrete concepts (M = .797/.203) did
not differ in their dependence on semantic association/similarity.

51
3.4.3 DISCUSSION
Table 10 summarizes the predictions based on DRF, as well as the state of
evidence for or against them.
Table 10. Summary of evidence for DRF predictions (P29-P32)
Predictions
Evidence
#s of unique pairs (per type of relation)
P29
SA: VA > C « SS: C > VA
Opposite (SA: VA < C « SS: C < VA)
P30
No
SA: A > C « SS: C > A
Proportions of participants (per type of relation)
P31
SA: VA > C « SS: C > VA
Opposite (SA: VA < C « SS: C < VA)
P32
No
SA: A > C « SS: C > A
Note. VA = very abstract, A = abstract, C = concrete, SA = semantically associated, SS =
semantically similar

None of the predictions were confirmed using either measure of relative
dependence (i.e., based on numbers of unique word association pairs or
proportions of participants). In fact, results were opposite to expectations
whenever very abstract concepts were compared to concrete concepts. That is,
very abstract concepts relied less rather than more on semantic association than
did concrete concepts, and by consequence, more rather than less on semantic
similarity. Figure 7 depicts these relationships, and contrasts them with DRF's
predicted relationships.

Figure 7. Two possible relationships between concreteness and semantic similarity/association
proposed by DRF (A, B) compared to relationships found in the present study (C1 = relative
dependence based on numbers of unique pairs, C2 = relative dependence based on proportions of
participants). Parts of figure recreated from Crutch & Warrington (2010, p .48). Note that y-axes of
graphs use different scales. Note that L = low, H = high.

The present results provide no support for DRF, and are also difficult to interpret
in terms of other theories. For example, even if—as Crutch and Warrington
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(2010) discuss—we equate semantic similarity with a nonverbal system and
semantic association with a verbal system, the results continue to be elusive.

3.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS
3.5.1 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS
We include here extra results from the TUKEY tests performed on the concept
type x systemsantos and concept type x systemintuit interactions that were found
(Table 11), as well as the concept type x class interaction that was found (Table
12). We save the implications of these results for the General Discussion.
Table 11. Extra results from TUKEY tests performed on the concept type x systemsantos and concept
type x systemintuit interactions (note: the two interactions are from separate ANOVAs)
Condition
Avg. #s of
TUKEY HSD
Avg. prop. of
TUKEY HSD
pairs
partic.
SANTOS
Verbal/Linguistic
Very Abstract – Abstract
.272 – .236
1.831
Very Abstract – Concrete
.272 – .253
.966
Abstract – Concrete
.236 – .253
.859
Nonverbal/Simulation
Very Abstract – Abstract
.473 – .530
2.899
Very Abstract – Concrete
.473 – .618
**7.373
Abstract – Concrete
.530 – .618
**4.445
INTUIT
Verbal/Linguistic
Very Abstract – Abstract
9.289 – 6.892
*3.944
.494 – .436
1.713
Very Abstract – Concrete
9.289 – 5.730
**5.856
.494 – .434
1.772
Abstract – Concrete
6.892 – 5.730
1.899
.436 – .434
.059
Nonverbal/Simulation
Very Abstract – Abstract
8.184 – 8.919
1.209
.251 – .330
2.333
Very Abstract – Concrete
8.184 – 8.189
0.008
.251 – .437
**5.492
Abstract – Concrete
8.919 – 8.189
1.193
.330 – .437
3.139
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01

Larger numbers of unique verbal/linguisticintuit word association pairs were
produced for very abstract than concrete and abstract concepts, with no
difference between the latter two. By comparison, there was no difference in
proportions of participants who produced verbal/linguisticintuit word association
pairs between any of the three concept types.
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Table 12. Extra results from TUKEY tests performed on the concept type x class interaction
Condition
Avg. #s of pairs TUKEY HSD Avg. prop. of partic. TUKEY HSD
Categorical
Very Abstract – Abstract
8.026 – 5.811
**6.077
.443 – .400
1.853
Very Abstract – Concrete
8.026 – 4.595
**9.413
.443 – .363
*3.447
Abstract – Concrete
5.811 – 4.595
3.314
.400 – .363
1.584
Entity-based
Very Abstract – Abstract
.026 – .054
.077
.002 – .001
.043
Very Abstract – Concrete
.026 – 3.730
**10.163
.002 – .168
**7.152
Abstract – Concrete
.054 – 3.730
**10.019
.001 – .168
**7.147
Introspective
Very Abstract – Abstract
2.289 – 2.135
.423
.067 – .075
.345
Very Abstract – Concrete
2.289 – .730
**4.277
.067 – .061
.259
Abstract – Concrete
2.135 – .730
*3.829
.075 – .061
.599
Lexical
Very Abstract – Abstract
1.263 – 1.081
.499
.051 – .036
.646
Very Abstract – Concrete
1.263 – 1.135
.351
.051 – .071
.862
Abstract – Concrete
1.081 – 1.135
.147
.036 – .071
1.498
Situational
Very Abstract – Abstract
5.868 – 6.730
2.365
.182 – .255
3.145
Very Abstract – Concrete
5.868 – 3.730
**5.866
.182 – .208
1.120
Abstract – Concrete
6.730 – 3.730
**8.177
.255 – .208
2.012
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01

Larger numbers of unique categorical word association pairs were produced for
very abstract than both concrete and abstract concepts. However, there was no
difference in numbers of unique categorical word association pairs produced for
abstract and concrete concepts. Furthermore, larger proportions of participants
produced categorical word association pairs for very abstract than concrete
concepts. However, there was no difference in proportions of participants who
produced categorical word association pairs for abstract versus very abstract or
concrete concepts.
In addition, larger numbers of unique entity-based word association pairs were
produced for concrete than both very abstract and abstract concepts, with no
difference between the latter two. Similarly, larger proportions of participants
produced unique entity-based word association pairs for concrete than both very
abstract and abstract concepts, with no difference between the latter two.
Finally, larger numbers of unique introspective as well as unique situational word
association pairs were produced for very abstract and abstract concepts than for
concrete concepts, with no differences between the former two
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION

4.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION
4.1.1 REGARDING MAIN RESULTS
In this thesis, we described and, using word association, tested several theories
of conceptual representation motivated by the abstract/concrete concept
distinction (or, where not motivated by it, with potential implications related to it).
Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007) argues that abstract concepts are
represented in a verbal but not a nonverbal system, whereas concrete concepts
are represented in both. We found no support for this claim using our first
measure (i.e., "number of unique word association pairs..."), which treated all
unique word association pairs produced by at least two participants as equally
indicative of conceptual representation within a given system. By comparison, we
found mixed support for the claim using our second measure (i.e., "proportion of
participants..."), which treated unique word association pairs produced by at least
two participants as more indicative of conceptual representation within a given
system if produced by more participants. In the case of our second measure, we
found two different patterns of results depending on how we assigned word
association pairs to the verbal/linguistic and nonverbal/simulation systems.
When categorical word association pairs were assigned in equal proportion to the
verbal and nonverbal system, larger proportions of participants produced
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for concrete than either very abstract
or abstract concepts. This points to concrete concepts having greater
representation in the nonverbal system than either very abstract or abstract
concepts. Therefore, like some of the neuroanatomical studies discussed in the
introduction (e.g., Holcomb, 1999), our study provides at least some evidence
that concrete concepts share a privileged relationship with nonverbal processes.
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Worth noting is that Marques and Nunes (2012) found no difference in
proportions of sensorimotor-based (i.e., nonverbal/simulation) word association
pairs produced for abstract and concrete concepts. One possible reason for this
is that they chose not to include their taxonomic (i.e., categorical) word
association pairs as part of either of their systems. This might have led them to
underestimate numbers of sensorimotor-based (i.e., nonverbal/simulation) word
association pairs produced for concrete concepts.
Another finding based on equal assignment of word association pairs to the
verbal and nonverbal system was that larger proportions of participants produced
nonverbal/simulation than verbal/linguistic word association pairs for very
abstract and abstract concepts. This points to very abstract and abstract
concepts having greater representation in the nonverbal than verbal system,
which is clearly at odds with DCT's proposed asymmetry. Nevertheless, DCT is
able to accommodate these findings because it allows for referential connections
between its two systems (Paivio, 1986, p. 58, 2007, p. 101-102). Hypothetically,
very abstract and abstract concepts may have generated nonverbal word
association pairs through a verbal system intermediary. This finding also
contradicts Marques and Nunes (2012) finding in which larger proportions of
language-based (i.e., verbal/linguistic) than sensorimotor-based (i.e.,
nonverbal/simulation) word association pairs were produced for abstract
concepts. Again, their choice to ignore taxonomic (i.e., categorical) word
association pairs may be responsible for our differing results.
When categorical word association pairs were assigned solely to the
verbal/linguistic system, larger proportions of participants produced
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for concrete than very abstract but
not abstract concepts. This points to concrete concepts having greater
representation in the nonverbal system than very abstract, but not abstract,
concepts, which provides mixed support for DCT. Comparably, larger proportions
of participants produced verbal/linguistic than nonverbal/simulation word
association pairs for very abstract, but not abstract, concepts. This also points to
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very abstract, but not abstract, concepts having greater representation in the
verbal than nonverbal system, which again provides mixed support for DCT. The
pattern of results here also lends support to the two-factor model of abstractness,
which says that not only is there a distinction between abstract and concrete
concepts, but also between different types of abstract concepts (WiemerHastings et al., 2001). It appears there are at least two types of abstract
concepts, and that the more abstract type has greater representation in the
verbal system. Direct comparisons between very abstract and abstract concepts
support this idea. In our extra analyses, we found that larger numbers of unique
verbal/linguisticintuit word association pairs were produced for very abstract than
abstract concepts. Furthermore, we found that larger numbers of unique
categorical word association pairs were produced for very abstract than abstract
concepts, implying that the categorical aspect of the verbal/linguistic system is
what really separates very abstract from abstract concepts.
Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) argues that abstract
concepts are represented nonverbally, particularly in a simulation system. We
found strong support for this claim using both of our measures. Significantly more
than zero unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were produced for
very abstract and abstract concepts. Furthermore, proportions of participants
significantly larger than zero produced nonverbal/simulation word association
pairs for very abstract and abstract concepts. Both of these results suggest that
very abstract and abstract concepts are, indeed, represented in the simulation
system. Putting aside the possibility of referential connections between systems,
both results also oppose DCT's claim that abstract concepts are not represented
in the nonverbal system.
PSS suggests also that the focus in the simulation system might be different for
abstract and concrete concepts (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005).
Simulations related to abstract concepts might focus on introspective and
setting/event properties of situations, whereas those related to concrete concepts
might focus on critical objects and their properties. We found strong support for
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these claims using our first measure. Larger numbers of unique introspective
than entity-based word association pairs were produced for very abstract and
abstract concepts. Furthermore, larger numbers of unique entity-based than
introspective word association pairs were produced for concrete concepts. These
findings are in general agreement with between-concept type findings from
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) and Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005). By
comparison, we found mixed support for PSS's claims using our second
measure. As predicted, larger proportions of participants produced entity-based
than introspective word association pairs for concrete concepts. However, it was
not the case that larger proportions of participants produced introspective than
entity-based word association pairs for very abstract or abstract concepts.
Presumably, this was due to a floor effect, as proportions of participants who
produced introspective as well as entity-based word association pairs for very
abstract and abstract concepts were relatively small.
Language and Situated Simulations (Barsalou et al., 2008) argues that when
cues are words, the verbal/linguistic system is activated before the
nonverbal/simulation system. We found strong support for this claim using our
first measure (which is the only measure we used to test LASS). Regardless of
how we assigned word association pairs to the verbal/linguistic and
nonverbal/simulation systems, differences in numbers of quickly-produced
unique verbal/linguistic and nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were
greater than differences in numbers of slowly-produced unique verbal/linguistic
and nonverbal/simulation word association pairs. This points to linguistic system
activation preceding simulation system activation when cues are words, as
proposed by LASS and first supported by Santos et al. (2011).
Different Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010)
argues that "abstract words have a relatively greater dependence than concrete
words upon representations of semantic association and that concrete words
have a relatively greater dependence than abstract words upon representations
of similarity-based information" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 47). In order to
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test this claim, we converted our two measures into measures of relative
dependence on semantic association/semantic similarity. Regardless of which of
our two converted measures was used, we found semantic similarity to be more
important to very abstract than concrete concepts—in direct contradiction to
DRF. Consequently, we found semantic association to be more important to
concrete than very abstract concepts. These results mirror results from Marques
and Nunes (2012), and add to a growing list of studies that have been unable to
replicate findings from Crutch and Warrington (2005, 2007, 2010).

4.1.2 REGARDING ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Outside of our predictions, we found several more relevant results. When
categorical word association pairs were assigned solely to the verbal/linguistic
system, larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word association pairs were
produced for very abstract than concrete concepts. This echoes Marques and
Nunes' (2012) finding in which larger proportions of language-based (i.e.,
verbal/linguistic) word association pairs were produced for abstract than concrete
concepts. However, we hesitate to interpret our finding as direct support for DCT.
DCT argues that abstract concepts are represented in the verbal but not the
nonverbal system, whereas concrete concepts are represented in both. It does
not necessarily follow that larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word
association pairs should be produced for very abstract than for concrete
concepts. In fact, larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word association
pairs could be produced for very abstract than for concrete concepts, and at the
same time, very abstract concepts could be relatively more dependent on the
nonverbal system than concrete concepts—in direct contradiction to DCT. This
might be the case if, for example, the average number of unique verbal/linguistic
versus nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for very abstract concepts is
10 versus 20, respectively, and for concrete concepts is 5 versus 5, respectively.
Admittedly, this is an extremely contrived example. In our study, these values for
very abstract concepts were 9.289 versus 8.184, respectively, and for concrete
concepts, they were 5.730 versus 8.189, respectively. Nevertheless, it is
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unknown if, relative to nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs, larger
numbers of unique verbal/linguisticintuit pairs were produced for very abstract than
concrete concepts. Worth noting is that similar arguments may be applied against
our own predictions, such as the prediction that "larger numbers of unique
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced for concrete than
very abstract concepts". Larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulation word
association pairs could be produced for concrete than very abstract concepts,
and at the same time, concrete concepts could be more relatively more
dependent on the verbal system than very abstract concepts. However, because
DCT explicitly claims that abstract concepts have no representation in the
nonverbal system, whereas concrete concepts do, we feel our prediction was
justified from an a priori perspective.
Larger numbers of unique categorical word association pairs were produced for
very abstract than concrete concepts. Furthermore, larger proportions of
participants produced categorical word association pairs for very abstract than
concrete concepts. Because numbers of unique lexical word association pairs as
well as proportions of participants who produced them did not differ between
concept types, these findings suggest that the categorical class was responsible
for the abovementioned finding involving verbal/linguistic system differences
between very abstract and concrete concepts. This is especially noteworthy
because Marques and Nunes (2012) did not include categorical (i.e.,
taxonomical) word association pairs as part of their language-based (i.e.,
verbal/linguistic) system. Therefore, while we get comparable results, we appear
to get them for different reasons.
When categorical word association pairs were assigned solely to the
verbal/linguistic system, larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word
association pairs were produced for very abstract than abstract concepts.
Additionally, there was no difference in numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word
association pairs produced for abstract and concrete concepts. Taken together,
these results suggest—in line with the two-factor model of abstractness (Wiemer-
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Hastings et al., 2001)—that there are two types of abstract concepts, and that
they are represented in the verbal/linguistic system to differing extents.
Larger numbers of unique categorical word association pairs were produced for
very abstract than abstract concepts. Additionally, there was no difference in
numbers of unique categorical word association pairs produced for abstract and
concrete concepts. Because numbers of unique lexical word association pairs did
not differ across concept types, these findings suggest that the categorical class
was responsible for the abovementioned finding involving verbal/linguistic system
differences between very abstract and abstract concepts. Note also that we
found no difference in numbers of unique introspective word association pairs
produced or proportions of participants who produced them for very abstract and
abstract concepts. This opposes earlier work showing that abstract concepts
differ among each other according to the amount of introspective information they
contain (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001).
Larger numbers of unique entity-based word association pairs were produced for
concrete than both very abstract and abstract concepts. Furthermore, larger
proportions of participants produced entity-based word association pairs for
concrete than either very abstract or abstract concepts. This is in general
agreement with Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) finding that, relative to
other types of properties, concrete concepts rely on entity properties more than
do abstract concepts. However, we hesitate to interpret our finding as direct
support for PSS. PSS argues that simulations related to abstract concepts might
focus on introspective and setting/event properties of situations, whereas those
related to concrete concepts might focus on critical objects and their properties. It
does not necessarily follow that larger numbers of unique entity-based word
association pairs should be produced for concrete than very abstract or abstract
concepts. In fact, larger numbers of unique entity-based pairs could be produced
for concrete than very abstract or abstract concepts, and at the same time,
concrete concepts could focus less on them. This might be the case if, for
example, the average number of unique entity-based word association pairs
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versus all other word association pairs for concrete concepts is 6 versus 30,
respectively, and for very abstract concepts is 5 versus 5, respectively.
Admittedly, this is an extremely contrived example. In our study, these values for
concrete concepts were 3.730 versus 10.190, respectively, and for very abstract
concepts, they were 0.026 versus 17.446, respectively. These values bode well
for PSS, but formal analysis is still required to determine if, relative to all other
unique word association pairs, significantly larger numbers of unique entitybased word association pairs were produced for concrete than for very abstract
concepts.
Larger numbers of unique situational word association pairs were produced for
very abstract and abstract concepts than for concrete concepts. This is in general
agreement with Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) finding that, relative to
other types of properties, abstract concepts rely on setting/event properties more
than do concrete concepts. For reasons similar to those outlined above, we
hesitate to interpret this finding as direct support for PSS.
Finally, larger numbers of unique introspective word association pairs were
produced for very abstract and abstract concepts than for concrete concepts.
This is consistent with abstract concepts being more emotionally valenced than
concrete concepts (Kousta et al., 2011).

4.1.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The present study includes several limitations. The first is that it does not control
for frequency and familiarity ratings, which introduces a potential confound.
Chaffin (1997) found that, among semantic word association pairs12, highfrequency/familiarity concepts (i.e., stimulus words) tend to produce event-based
(comparable to our situational) word association pairs, whereas lowfrequency/familiarity concepts tend to produce definitional (comparable to our
categorical) word association pairs. Because our very abstract and abstract
12

Comparable to all word association pairs in our study excluding lexical pairs.
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concepts were more frequent and familiar than our concrete concepts, and
because larger numbers of unique situational word association pairs were
produced for them, there is a degree of overlap between Chaffin's results and
ours, at the high end. However, in our defense, our concrete concepts and two
sets of abstract concepts may not have been different enough to reproduce
Chaffin's finding. The difference in familiarity between our concrete concepts and
our two sets of abstract concepts was small; approximately 20 to 30 on a 700point scale. In addition, all three concepts types had in common the fact that they
produced generally high ratings. In fact, the least familiar words used in our study
were canoe and saxophone. Note that this may also be the reason why we did
not replicate Chaffin's results for low-frequency/familiarity concepts.
The second limitation is that we do not control for part of speech across concept
types. It is known that word association cues tend to evoke targets from their own
grammatical class (Deese, 1965, p. 103). For example, nouns tend to evoke
nouns, and verbs tend to evoke verbs. It is conceivable, then, that some of our
results were driven not by differences in concept type, but rather part of speech.
Consider, for example, the likely scenario that entity-based targets are more
often nouns than are other targets. Because our concrete concepts were almost
universally nouns whereas our very abstract and abstract concepts were around
40% nouns, findings such as "larger proportions of participants produced
nonverbal/simulation [largely entity-based] word association pairs for concrete
than very abstract concepts" could be due to nouns evoking nouns, rather than
greater representation in the nonverbal/simulation system for concrete than very
abstract concepts.
The third limitation is that all assignments of word association pairs to classes
were ultimately up to the discretion of a single coder. Although, the coder
attempted to avoid systematic bias of any sort in their assignments, and although
assignments were influenced by the initial two coders, it would be preferable to
have multiple coders in this role. Having multiple coders also enables the
calculation of inter-coder reliability.
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The final limitation is that the study does not directly address DCT's proposal
regarding referential connections between its systems. Doing so may have given
us insight into the validity of our two measures. For example, if no evidence was
found in support of referential connections, results for predictions 7 and 8 would
be more difficult to explain using DCT (recall, these results showed that larger
numbers of unique nonverbal/simulation than verbal/linguistic system word
association pairs were produced for very abstract and abstract concepts—
opposite to expectations). Consequently, we might favor the intuition-based over
Santos-based characterization of systems, but more importantly, our first
measure over our second measure.
Future work should focus on addressing the major limitations we have outlined.
That is, it should: (1) control for frequency and familiarity ratings across concept
types, (2) control for part of speech across concept types, (3) rely on multiple
coders for final assignments of word association pairs to classes, and (4)
examine more directly the potential role of referential connections between DCT's
systems.
Regarding the fourth limitation, one option is to examine reaction times for
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for very abstract and abstract versus
concrete concepts. If referential connections are involved, very abstract and
abstract concepts are likely to produce nonverbal/simulation word association
pairs in the following manner: (1) abstract concept verbal information activates
concrete concept verbal information (e.g., cue/word: danger ® word: highway),
(2) concrete concept verbal information activates concrete concept nonverbal
information (e.g., word: highway ® image: a sign), (3) concrete concept
nonverbal information activates concrete concept verbal information (e.g., image:
a sign ® word: sign), (4) concrete concept verbal information initiates a response
(e.g., word: sign ® target/word: sign). By comparison, concrete concepts are
likely to produce nonverbal/simulation word association pairs in this manner: (1)
concrete concept verbal information activates concrete concept nonverbal
information (e.g., cue/word: balloon ® image: sky), (2) concrete concept
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nonverbal information activates concrete concept verbal information (e.g., image:
sky ® word: sky), (3) concrete concept verbal information initiates a response
(e.g., word: sky ® target/word: sky). Based on the steps involved in these two
routes, a fair assumption is that individuals are faster at producing
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for concrete than very abstract and
abstract concepts13. Note that the data from the present study could, in theory,
be used to examine this idea. For example, we might compare the proportion of
common to uncommon unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for
very abstract concepts to the proportion for concrete concepts. Of course, actual
reaction times are preferable.

4.1.4 CONCLUSION
Taken as a whole, our results point to DRF as an untenable theory of abstract
and concrete concept representation. However, they do little to arbitrate among
DCT and PSS. The reason for this is that our two measures produce largely
contrasting results. However, if we assume that our first measure is a better
estimation of conceptual representation—as Deese might be inclined to do
(1965, p. 175)—a clearer picture emerges. In this picture, we find that PSS is
strongly supported by our results. By contrast, DCT is almost universally
unsupported by them. Of course, this is mere speculation. If we choose to
speculate instead on behalf of our second measure, we reach conclusions that
could be interpreted as more favorable to DCT.
Finally, we might remark on the novelty of this study. While earlier studies have
used word association to test theories motivated by the abstract/concrete
distinction, ours is the first study use word association and: (1) find evidence for
DCT's claim that concrete concepts are represented in the nonverbal system to a
greater extent than are abstract concepts (i.e., predictions 5, 6, and 13); (2) find

13

Note that participants are faster at generating word association pairs for concrete than abstract
concepts in general (de Groot, 1989). It is possible, then, that between-concept type differences in
reaction time for nonverbal/simulation word association pairs drive this effect.
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evidence in total opposition to DCT's above claim (i.e., predictions 7 and 8); (3)
test and find evidence for PSS's claim that simulations related to abstract
concepts focus on introspective properties (i.e., predictions 19 and 20); (4) test
and find evidence for PSS's claim that simulations related to concrete concepts
focus on entity-based properties (i.e., predictions 21 and 26); (5) test and find
evidence for LASS's claim that linguistic system activity precedes simulation
system activity when cues are words (i.e., predictions 27 and 28); (6) find
evidence for the two-factor model of abstractness (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001);
and (7) find evidence for the claim that abstract concepts are more emotionally
valenced than concrete concepts (Kousta et al., 2011).

4.2 SUMMARY
In this thesis, we described and, using word association, tested several theories
of conceptual representation motivated by the abstract/concrete concept
distinction (or, where not motivated by it, with potential implications related to it).
These included Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007), Perceptual Symbol
Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008), Language and Situated Simulations (Barsalou
et al., 2008), and Different Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington,
2005, 2007, 2010). We found mixed support for Dual Coding Theory and
Perceptual Symbol Systems, strong support for Language and Situated
Simulations, and no support for Different Representational Frameworks.
It is our hope that future investigations will benefit from the protocols laid out in
this thesis, which demonstrate how the abstract/concrete concept distinction can
be studied using word association.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Very abstract, abstract, and concrete concepts
VERY ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT

CONCRETE

Ability
Anxious
Awkward
Blame
Bored
Challenge
Chance
Concept
Depressed
Eager
Easy
Effect
Genuine
Gone
Guilt
Hope
Impossible
Independent
Instance
Justify
Know
Logic
Luck
Manner
Must
Nervous
Opinion
Other
Polite
Proud
Purpose
Reality
Regret
Unfair
Unique
Unknown
Vague
Value

Advice
Afraid
Allow
Angry
Brave
Cause
Confidence
Crisis
Danger
Dare
Definition
Excited
Extra
Fear
Freedom
Friendship
Habit
Happy
Here
Hesitate
Ignore
Join
Lazy
Less
Lonely
Mad
Memory
Missing
More
Neglect
Panic
Quality
Relief
Sad
Safety
Same
Surprise

Ant
Apple
Balloon
Bed
Boot
Canoe
Cheese
Cherry
Climb
Clock
Cream
Cucumber
Dolphin
Drum
Eagle
Elephant
Garlic
Gown
Hammer
Jacket
Knife
Pencil
Piano
Pickle
Pig
Pliers
Raccoon
Robin
Saw
Saxophone
Screwdriver
Stove
Tangerine
Telephone
Turtle
Violin
Walnut
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Appendix B. Data profile for an example concept, 'walnut'

type
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete
concrete

concept/
cue
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut
walnut

target
peanut
nut
pecan
tree
crack
squirrel
almond
chestnut
shell
acorn
brown
cookie
eat
food
peas

group
size
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147

# of
partic.
30
25
14
13
7
7
6
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2

FSG
.204
.170
.095
.088
.048
.048
.041
.020
.020
.014
.014
.014
.014
.014
.014

subclass
c-coord
c-super
c-coord
s-loc
s-action
s-living
c-coord
c-coord
e-excomp
c-coord
e-exsurf
e-whole
s-action
c-ont
c-coord

class
categorical
categorical
categorical
situational
situational
situational
categorical
categorical
entity-based
categorical
entity-based
entity-based
situational
categorical
categorical

system system type of
santos
intuit
relation
both
V/L
similar
both
V/L
assoc.
both
V/L
similar
NV/S NV/S assoc.
NV/S NV/S assoc.
NV/S NV/S assoc.
both
V/L
similar
both
V/L
similar
NV/S NV/S assoc.
both
V/L
similar
NV/S NV/S assoc.
NV/S NV/S assoc.
NV/S NV/S assoc.
both
V/L
assoc.
both
V/L
similar

# OF UNIQUE PAIRS

PROP. OF PARTIC.

CLASS
Categorical
Entity-based
Introspective
Lexical
Situational

8
3
0
0
4

.572
.048
.000
.000
.198

SYSTEMsantos
Nonverbal/Simulationsantos
Verbal/Linguisticsantos

11
4

.532
.286

SYSTEMintuit
Nonverbal/Simulationintuit
Verbal/Linguisticintuit

7
8

.572
.246

TYPE OF RELATION
Semantically similar
Semantically associated

6
9

.388
.430
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Appendix C. Scheme modified from Wu & Barsalou (2009)
CATEGORICAL (C)
A category in the taxonomy to which a concept belongs.
¡ SYNONYM (C-SYN) – A synonym of a concept (e.g., car-automobile, catfeline, humiliate-embarrass).
¡ ANTONYM (C-ANT) – An antonym of a concept (e.g., ability-inability, absentpresent).
¡ SIMILAR CONCEPT (C-SIM) – A concept with a similar meaning that is not
actually a synonym (e.g., hot-warm, abduct-steal, ignore-leave).
¡ ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY (C-ONT) – A category for a basic kind of thing in
existence, including thing, substance, object, human, animal, plant, location,
time, activity, event, action, state, thought, emotion (e.g., cat-animal, computerobject).
¡ SUPERORDINATE (C-SUPER) – A category one level above a concept in a
taxonomy (e.g., car-vehicle, apple-fruit, guilt-feeling).
¡ COORDINATE (C-COORD) – Another category in the superordinate category
to which a concept belongs (e.g., apple-orange, oak-elm).
¡ SUBORDINATE (C-SUBORD) – A category one level below the target concept
in a taxonomy (e.g., chair-rocking chair, frog-tree frog, habit-smoking).
¡ SUBTYPE (C-TYPE) – A type of a concept that is neither strictly a subordinate
nor an instance (e.g., ability-physical).
¡ INDIVIDUAL (C-INDIV) – A specific instance of a concept (e.g., car-my car,
house-my parents’ house, awkward-me).

ENTITY-BASED (E)
Properties of a concrete entity, either animate or inanimate. Besides being a
single self-contained object, an entity can be a coherent collection of objects
(e.g., forest).
¡ EXTERNAL COMPONENT (E-EXCOMP) – A three-dimensional component of
an entity that normally resides on its surface (e.g., car-headlight, tree-leaves).
¡ INTERNAL COMPONENT (E-INCOMP) – A three-dimensional component of
an entity that normally resides completely inside the closed surface of the entity
(e.g., apple-seeds, jacket-lining).
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¡ EXTERNAL SURFACE PROPERTY (E-EXSURF) – An external property of an
entity that is not a component, and that is perceived on or beyond the entity's
surface, including shape, color, pattern, texture, touch, smell, taste, sound, etc.
(e.g., watermelon-oval, apple-red).
¡ INTERNAL SURFACE PROPERTY (E-INSURF) – An internal property of an
entity that is not a component, that is not normally perceived on the entity’s
exterior surface, and that is only perceived when the entity’s interior surface is
exposed, includes color, pattern, texture, size, touch, smell, taste, etc. (e.g.,
apple-white, watermelon-juicy).
¡ SUBSTANCE/MATERIAL (E-MAT) – The material or substance of which
something is made (e.g., floor-wood, shirt-cloth).
¡ SPATIAL RELATION (E-SPAT) – A spatial relation between two or more
properties within an entity, or between an entity and one of its properties (e.g.,
car-window above door, watermelon-green outside).
¡ SYSTEMIC PROPERTY (E-SYS) – A global systemic property of an entity or
its parts, including states, conditions, abilities, traits, etc. (e.g., cat-alive, dolphinintelligent, car-fast).
¡ LARGER WHOLE (E-WHOLE) – A whole to which an entity belongs (e.g.,
window-house, apple-tree).
¡ ENTITY BEHAVIOR (E-BEH) – A chronic behavior of an entity that is
characteristic of its nature, and that is described as a characteristic property of
the entity, not as a specific intentional action in a situation (e.g., tree-blows in the
wind, bird-flies, person-eats).
¡ ABSTRACT ENTITY PROPERTY (E-ABSTR) – An abstract property of the
target entity not dependent on a particular situation (e.g., teacher-democrat,
transplanted californian-buddhist).
¡ QUANTITY (E-QUANT) – A numerosity, frequency, size, intensity, or typicality
of an entity or its properties (e.g., jacket-an article of clothing, cat-four legs, treelots of leaves, apple-common fruit, watermelon-usually green, apple-very red).

INTROSPECTIVE (I)
A property of a subject’s mental state as he or she views a situation, or a
property of a character’s mental state in a situation.
¡ AFFECT/EMOTION (I-EMOT) – An affective or emotional state toward the
situation or one of its components by either the subject or a participant (e.g.,
magic-a sense of excitement, vacation-I was happy, smashed car-anger, panicanxiety, nervous).
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¡ EVALUATION (I-EVAL) – A positive or negative evaluation of a situation or one
of its components by either the subject or a participant (e.g., apples-I like them,
vacation-I wrote a stupid paper, crisis-bad). Typically more about the situation or
component than about the perceiver, often attributing a trait to it (e.g., beautiful,
common). Use i-emot when the focus is more on the perceiver and on a
traditional emotional state.
¡ REPRESENTATIONAL STATE (I-REP) – A relatively static or stable
representational state in the mind of a situational participant, including beliefs,
goals, desires, ideas, perceptions, etc. (e.g., smashed car-believed it was not
working, tree-wanted to cut it down, tree-had a good view of a bird in it).
¡ COGNITIVE OPERATION (I-COGOP) – An online operation or process on a
cognitive state, including retrieval, comparison, learning, etc. (e.g., watermelon-I
remember a picnic, rolled grass-looks like a burrito, car-I learned how to drive).
¡ CONTINGENCY (I-CONTIN) – A contingency between two or more aspects of
a situation, including: conditionals and causals, such as if, enable, cause,
because, becomes, underlies, depends, requires, etc.; correlations such as
correlated, uncorrelated, negatively correlated, etc.; others including possession
and means (e.g., car-requires gas, tree-has leaves depending on the type of tree,
vacation-free from work, magic-I was excited because I got to see the magician
perform, car-my car).
¡ NEGATION (I-NEG) – An explicit mention of the absence of something, with
absence requiring a mental state that represents the opposite (e.g., car-no air
conditioning, apple-not an orange).
¡ QUANTITY (I-QUANT) – A numerosity, frequency, intensity, or typicality of an
introspection or one of its properties (e.g., truth-a set of beliefs, buy-I was very
angry at the saleswoman, magic-I was quite baffled by the magician).

LEXICAL (L)
A purely language-based associate.
¡ MORHPOLOGICAL (L-MORPH) – A form of the word that is not an antonym
(e.g., hope-hopeful).
¡ COMPOUND CONTINUATION FORWARD (L-COMPF) – The cue plus
response is a phrase, with no other plausible relation (e.g., eager-beaver).
¡ COMPOUND CONTINUATION BACKWARD (L-COMPB) – The cue plus
response is a phrase in the opposite direction, with no other plausible relation
(e.g., beaver-eager).
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SITUATIONAL (S)
A property of a situation, where a situation typically includes one or more agents,
at some place and time, engaging in an event, with one or more entities in
various semantic roles (e.g., picnic, conversation, vacation, meal).
¡ PERSON (S-PERSON) – An individual person or multiple people in a situation
(e.g., toy-children, car-passenger, furniture-person, brave-soldier).
¡ LIVING THING (S-LIVING) – A living thing in a situation that is not a person,
including other animals and plants (e.g., sofa-cat, park-grass, fear-snake).
¡ OBJECT (S-OBJECT) – An inanimate object in a situation, except buildings
(e.g., watermelon-on a plate, cat-scratch sofa, freedom-flag).
¡ SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (S-SOCORG) – A social institution, a business, or a
group of people or animals in a situation (e.g., freedom-government, radio-kmart,
picnic-family, dog-pack, freedom-country).
¡ SOCIAL ARTIFACT (S-SOCART) – A relatively abstract entity—sometimes
partially physical (book) and sometimes completely conceptual (verb)—created in
the context of socio-cultural institutions (e.g., farm-a book (about), farm-a movie
(about), invention-a group project, (to) carpet-a verb).
¡ BUILDING (S-BUILD) – A building in a situation (e.g., book-library, candlechurch, guilt-court, safety-home).
¡ LOCATION (S-LOC) – A place in a situation where an entity can be found, or
where people engage in an event or activity (e.g., car-in a park, buy-in Paris).
¡ SPATIAL RELATION (S-SPAT) – A spatial relation between two or more things
in a situation (e.g., watermelon-the ants crawled across the picnic table,
vacation-we slept by the fire).
¡ TIME (S-TIME) – A time period associated with a situation/relationship/internal
state or with one of its properties (e.g., picnic-fourth of July, sled-during the
winter, friendship-lasting, forever). When an event is used as a time (e.g., muffinbreakfast), code the event as s-event.
¡ ACTION (S-ACTION) – An action (not introspective) that an agent (human or
non-human) performs intentionally in a situation (e.g., shirt-wear, apple-eat,
advice-listen). When the action is chronic and/or characteristic of the entity, use
e-beh.
¡ EVENT (S-EVENT) – A stand-alone event or activity in a situation where the
action is not foregrounded but is on a relatively equal par with the setting, agents,
entities, etc. (e.g., watermelon-picnic, car-trip, church-wedding, surprise-party).
Use s-action when the action is foregrounded (e.g., use s-action for churchmarry, but use s-event for church-wedding).
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¡ OUTCOME (S-OUT) – An outcome of an event or internal state (e.g.,
competition-win, crisis-death, humiliate-hurt).
¡ CAUSE (S-CAUS) – An event/situation/internal state that causes an emotional
cue word, or is typically associated with it (e.g., stress-work, disappoint-fail).
¡ MANNER (S-MANNER) – The manner in which an action or event is performed
in a situation (e.g., watermelon-sloppy eating, car-faster than walking). Or,
manners/behaviours associated with an internal state (lazy-slow, anxious-jumpy).
That is the modification of an action in terms of its quantity, duration, style, etc.
Code the action itself as s-action, s-event, or e-beh.
¡ FUNCTION (S-FUNC) – A typical goal or role that an entity serves for an agent
in a situation by virtue of its physical properties with respect to relevant actions
(e.g., car-transportation, clothing-protection).
¡ PHYSICAL STATE (S-PHYST) – A physical state of a situation or any of its
components except entities whose states are coded with e-sys, and social
organizations whose states are coded with s-socst (e.g., mountains-damp,
highway-congested).
¡ SOCIAL STATE (S-SOCST) – A state of a social organization in a situation
(e.g., family-cooperative, people-free).
¡ QUANTITY (S-QUANT) – A numerosity, frequency, intensity, or typicality of a
situation or any of its properties except of an entity, whose quantitative aspects
are coded with e-quant (e.g., vacation-lasted for eight days, car-a long drive).
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